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ABSTRACT
The dissertation is comprised of three independent essays. Each essay exam-
ines the process of qualitative change in the provisioning process from a different
vantage, while remaining fixed in relation to the Columbia River. Among the three
essays the period 1866 to 1945 is covered. The first essay examines development of
the region’s railroad system, and the aspirations on the part of its financiers to realize
speculative gains. The region is situated in the context of the post Civil War imperial
stance of the state, and the rise of global finance. It is argued that while other colonial
processes had operated in the region since the arrival of the fur trappers, construction
of railroads embodied a watershed in the commitment for absentee owners to engage
in transformational development.
The second essay traces the emergence of the electric utility globally, and in
reference to the Pacific Northwest. It is argued that the electric utility emerges di-
rectly from the railroad - finance nexus. Key social relationships are explored that
explain the emergence of the electric utility as a going concern, with particular em-
phasis placed upon Henry Villard. Villard’s financial connections were instrumental
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in establishing the markets in which Edison’s patents would become successful in gen-
eral. Villard’s relationship with Edison, both social and pecuniary in nature, would
shape the subsequent process of electrification for the region.
The third essay argues that transformation of the Columbia River basin into
a hydrological machine emerges as a response to the abuses of the electric utilities.
Development of the basin for power, navigation, and irrigation were viewed as a
means by which the inhabitants of the region might break the colonial yoke under
which the utilities absentee owners had placed them. Private utilities had squandered
the wealth embodied in the social technology, failing to provision inhabitants of the
region with electricity uniformly at a fair rate. Utilities at the base of a holding
company pyramid were used to extract surplus incomes from ratepayers, in part,
by inflating their rate bases. Moreover, private utilities wielded political power and
worked to undermine efforts to institute municipal or public power projects. Such
tension was felt regionally and nationally, galvanzing a countervailing force capable of
ushering in large-scale, public, hydroelectric projects. Notwithstanding the dreams of
New Deal planners, the Organic Machine would be placed into the narrower service
of powering the WWII aluminum plant.
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DEDICATION
In memory of Frederic S. Lee. You never died, says we.
If the workers take a notion
They can stop all speeding trains;
Every ship upon the ocean
They can tie with might chains.
Every wheel in the creation,
Every mine and every mill
Fleets and armies of the nation,
Will at their command stand still.
Joe Hill
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Before the emergence of capitalism in the Pacific Northwest there was a social
provisioning process1 in which the Columbia River was central. From the end of the
last ice age until recently indigenous groups interacted directly with the river and
the watershed that drained it, provisioning themselves through a mix of salmon pro-
duction and other hunter-gatherer techniques. Complex kinship networks connected
indigenous peoples of the region and embedded them in a social fabric in which the
institution of gift exchange was central2. At the center of this institutional fabric was
the Columbia River and the ceremonial reproduction of the salmon.
The aforementioned system was viable in the classical sense. A system is
viable if it can reproduce its own conditions of existence. The objective relations of
production are organized so they reproduce themselves within the system. In the
‘surplus approach’(Chiodi, 2010; Lee & Jo, 2011; Mongiovi, 2011) viability of the
simplest circular production system may be expressed formally as
1The term social provisioning process will be used infrequently henceforth. Het-
erodox economists have used the term to describe economic systems in response to
the tendency among mainstream economists to ignore social facts. The concept, how-
ever, is redundant as all economic systems are inherently social. The term will be
used only in reference to discourses on the term itself.
2Lichotawich (1999) provides a broad overview. Hunn & Salem (1990) provides a
detailed analysis of the Mid-Columbia Indians with regard to the gift. The Lower-
Columbia groups are studied in Hajda (1984).
1
a+ c→ 1 (1.1)
1− (a+ c) ≥ 0 (1.2)
where a ∈ (0, 1) is the quantity of salmon used as means of production per unit of
salmon produced, and c ∈ (0, 1) the quantity of salmon used as sustenance for persons
engaged in the production of salmon, as well as that used for gift exchange, per unit
of salmon produced 3. Obviously, the provisioning process was more complicated
than suggested by (1.1) and (1.2). The point here is to demonstrate that while the
gift exchange economy in which tribal groups of the Pacific Northwest were central
was viable for several millenia following the last ice age, it was rendered unviable
as the region became increasingly incorporated into the capitalist system. Before
considering the factors that effected such change, further elaboration of the concept
of viability in the surplus approach is warranted.
The Heterodox Surplus Approach
The heterodox surplus approach associated with Fred Lee connects the clas-
sical tradition in political economy, that which had been ‘submerged and forgotten’
(Sraffa, 1960) by the neoclassical tradition, with other discourses that seek to analyze
economic systems as they are socially embedded. The central core of the surplus
approach consists primarily of the problem of interconnectedness, and a commitment
to explaining the processes that ensure that these relations may be reproduced going
forward. As a starting point the surplus approach revived by Sraffa (1960) and his
3See Gregory (1982) for an application of the surplus approach to gift economies.
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followers, takes the surplus as given and proceeds to analyze distributional patterns
that allow for systemic reproduction. A comprehensive review of the surplus ap-
proach is not offered here, however, Kurz and Salvadori (2000) provides a thorough
treatment of the classical approach undergirding input - output analysis. See (Carter,
2011; Eatwell and Milgate, 1983; Garegnani, 1984, 1987; Mongiovi, 2002, 2011) for
a thorough treatment of the surplus approach as it is distinguished from both neo-
classical and other heterodox traditions in economics. For connections between the
surplus approach and institutional economics, see Forstater and Murray (2009).
Lee’s ‘heterodox’ surplus approach addresses a different set of questions. Lee
and Jo (2011) builds a model of the economy as a whole, one that incorporates the
interdependency of the surplus approach, while preserving its historical contingency
by reserving questions of agency and qualitative change for analysis in an evolu-
tionary framework. That is, optimizing and reductionist models of human behavior
cannot provide a foundation for a theory that purports to link agency with qualitative
change, because such interplay exists in historical time with a degree of complexity
that renders closed-system analysis as invalid. Agency, then, becomes a fact to be
explained in light of the historical conditions in which it is exercised, but it cannot
be reduced to an abstraction in logical time, for no such human behavior exists un-
der these conditions. The exercise of agency in capitalist economies, of an economic
nature, emerges as parties transact among themselves. One defining action is the
decision of what to produce and how much to commit the resources of the going
concern over a given period of time, a decision which must occur under conditions of
uncertainty. In capitalist economies the business enterprise emerges as the dominant
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site from which agency is exercised (Jo, 2007)
Lee does not take the surplus as given, suggesting instead that discretion over
production of the surplus drives the provisioning process in a capitalist economy. Class
privilege conditions the distribution of preferential access to the surplus as well as the
discretion over which goods constitute the surplus. Individual action occurs within
networks of social relations. Economic action is embedded in the social fabric at large,
which is conditioned by the many factors that serve to reproduce the institutional
fabric.
Viability
Recall, an economy is viable if it produces enough in the current period to
ensure that the system as a whole will generate the requisite inputs for each sec-
tor to carry out production in the subsequent period. The mechanisms that ensure
self-replacement give rise to exchange ratios between sectors, known as technical co-
efficients in the input - output literature. Embodied in each exchange ratio are a set
of social relations that form the basis for social production. Conceiving of the econ-
omy as a social embedded suggests that the social relationships that undergird these
technical relations ought to be subject to consideration of their viability, just as their
material counterparts. As Gugliemo Chiodi argues on Sraffa’s notion of viability:
Exchange [ratios] exclusively spring from those numerical values
which, were they adopted, would allow each industry to obtain back,
after the exchange, the necessary amount of the commodities needed
to start production again.... they have to be regarded as the basic
reference for making the reproduction of the whole system actually
realizable. The property of ‘viability’ is then the other side of the coin,
for it expresses the possibility of the system to continue production
over time. That possibility, it must be emphasized, is the reflection
of the specific numerical relations existing among all the commodities
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used and produced in the economy at a given point of time; rather,
they are the result of the far more important entire history which as
been characterizing the society considered, viz. the complex of social
and political relations among the people which have progressively come
into being over time (Chiodi, 2010; emphasis in original).
Thus, an examination of the viability of a given institutional fabric emerges as a
central object of inquiry in the heterodox surplus approach. Accordingly, the social
relationship serves as the fundamental unit of analysis in this dissertation. The deci-
sion is borne of an attempt to avoid the methodological error of reducing the analysis
to a single, isolated agent. Economic action is never an isolated affair - the individual
always stands at one side of a transaction with another party - so individual action
should always be taken in relation to the parties to which such action would concern.
Nor can social action be specified as an independent outcome of a single agent, but
rather one embedded in networks of social relationships.
Embeddedness and Change in the Provisioning Process
Changes in the provisioning process to such a degree as that which we have
witnessed in settling the West, introducing commodity production for the sole purpose
of realizing pecuniary gain, and reorganizing the institutional fabric so that capitalist
institutions become central, involve a process whereby unequal power relations are
brought to the fore (Robbins, 1994). In our quest to engage in a social theory that
avoids the methodological errors of reductionism, essentialism, reification and func-
tional teleology (Sibeon, 2004), we may proceed by conceiving of the problem as a
relationship between social structure on the one hand and agency on the other. The
institutional fabric conditions, mediates, and gives form to the provisioning process;
wherein individuals carry out their economic life process, acting upon these struc-
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tures and affecting reproduction. Power emerges as embedded individuals realize the
capacity to exert a disproportionate effect upon the reproduction of social structures
relative to others, by leveraging their privileged positions at the central junctures of
intersecting social networks.
On the Embedded Individual
In exploring how the concept of embeddedness contributes to the development
of the structure-agency problem in social theory, John B. Davis in The Theory of the
Individual, writes:
to say that individuals are embedded in historical social relationships
is quite close to saying that individuals disappear into those relation-
ships. Indeed, many would argue that the embedded individual con-
ception is not a conception of individuals at all, but rather a proposal
to ignore individuals, in order to focus on groups, classes, movements,
historical forces, history, and so on. According to this interpretation,
in fact, rather than there being two traditions of thinking about the
nature of the individual, there are really just two great traditions of
thinking about society - one that is individualist and includes individ-
uals as agents, and one that is collectivist in which it is not individuals
that are agents but instead groups, classes, movements, etc. (2013,
pg. 123)
Davis identifies an important problem for the economist: how does one theorize about
the relationship between the individual and society without veering the analysis to-
ward the polar extremes of methodological individualism and methodological collec-
tivism? One way out of the dilemma is to seek to understand how the embedded
individual affects the social structures in which they are embedded, through a frame-
work that encompasses agency as an emergent outcome of the complex interaction
of a range of social and institutional forces. In doing so one may question how some
individuals have the capacity to condition the evolution of the institutional fabric
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whereas others do not. Such differences in so-called “agency” cannot be reduced to
the individual nor can they disappear into the social structure4
One challenge facing this analysis is the confusion in usage of the term embed-
dedness. While it would be redundant to reproduce the work of a number of scholars
that have surveyed the literature on embeddedness, it is important to define usage
and understanding of the term here to avoid further confusion of the issue (Krippner
& Alvarez, 2007; Dale 2011). Defining what embeddedness means in the context of
the capitalist transformation of the Pacific Northwest benefits from engagement with
some of these differences in both the various strands of heterodox economics and
economic sociology.
Krippner and Alvarez (2007) distinguish between approaches to embeddedness
that follow in either the Polanyian (1944) or Granovetterian (1985) traditions among
economic sociologists. When used as an analytical device for examining the degree
to which the economy becomes embedded in or disembedded from the social, the
research question follows in the Polanyian tradition and is directed toward resolving
macro-level problems; the Granovetterian tradition focuses on micro or meso-level
phenomena situated in social networks (Krippner & Alvarez, 2007, pg. 221). For
Krippner and Alvarez either approach serves as a “powerful platform for launching a
critique of neoclassical economics but is much less useful when turned toward the task
of developing a positive research program for economic sociologists” (2007, pg. 221).
4Agency, as it is defined here, and influence are not equivalent in meaning. While
it is likely that a person so empowered to act in an institutional capacity will also be
influential, it does not follow necessarily that such agency depends upon influence.
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Hence, insofar as embeddedness establishes the foundation for a research program in
economic sociology it fails in providing coherence and internal consistency apart from
its criticism of Homo economicus.
Supporting Krippner and Alvarez (2007), Dale (2011) argues that Granovet-
ter (1985) has cast the problem of embeddedness as a problem of economic action,
situating the atomic individual in a relational context in which social relations give
meaning to action. Accordingly, the embeddedness approach in economic sociology
diverges from the meaning and use established by Polanyi.
The present purpose of the dissertation is not to resolve the tension in diver-
gent approaches to embeddedness. Rather, in using the concept of embeddedness it
is acknowledged that analysis of the cumulative development of any provisioning pro-
cess begins by situating those elements of the institutional fabric that are conceived
of as economic as mutually constitutive of the institutional fabric. The institutional
fabric may be analysed in a relational manner, suggesting a role for the Granovet-
terian tradition a la social network analysis, as well as from the Polanyian tradition
of critiquing the liberal thesis of the ontologically prior economy as an analytic cat-
egory with independent meaning. To the extent that I employ embeddedness in the
Polanyian fashion, I reject the notion of the disembedded economy as a concept de-
void of meaning (Beckert, 2009; Block, 2003; Dale, 2011; Jessop, 2001; Krippner,
2002; Somers & Block, 2005). Markets do not exist in the absence of social systems
and do not operate independent of them. Therefore, they are always embedded in a
nexus of social relations.
Integrating the concept of embeddedness with the understanding of the econ-
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omy as a provisioning process, allows one to envision provisioning from an historically
contingent vantage; the interplay between structure and agency may be viewed as the
moment at which the evolutionary process unfolds. The concept of the embedded in-
dividual acting within an institutional framework enables analysis that does not run
afoul of Sibeon’s four cardinal sins of social theory: reductionism, essentialism, reifi-
cation and functional teleology (2004).
Why Did the Provisioning Process Change?
Capitalists from the east managed to change the provisioning process so that it
no longer reproduced itself as an embedded process within the social system in which
peoples indigenous to the Pacific Northwest were central. Because some persons
embedded in capitalist social networks were able to exert their agency over the region
as whole, a new set of productive relations took root that rendered the old system
unviable. One of the central moments in this process was the arrival of the railroads
and the capital5 that emerged with it in the region. Once this capital structure was
in place, those that sought to maintain its viability went to work to incorporate other
technologies, such as electricity, in the process of creating and maintaining markets
in the region. Such development proceeded in direct relation to the Columbia River
basin, culminating in the rationalization of the river itself as an important aspect of
the machine process. Figure 1 illustrates the distinction between the two provisioning
5Capital is taken here to mean an articulation of a set of economic, political, and
social relations that allow for the production and appropriation of pecuniary value.
This definition is constructed so that both Classical and Institutional theoretical
issues may be dealt with on common ground.
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processes. In the economic system that precedes capitalism (SPPG ) the provisioning
Figure 1. Two qualitatively distinct provisioning processes.
Source: Constructed by author based upon historical data related to each provisioning
process.
process is embedded in a society in which gift exchange and ceremonial reproduction
of salmon are central. Indigenous labor (LI ), using produced means of production
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(G), fished the Columbia (R) for salmon (S ). The relations between LI , G , S , and
R must be reproduced for the system as whole to remain viable. In the capitalist
economy that follows (SPPC) the provisioning process is embedded in a society in
which the institution of private property is central and the river is placed in the service
of the production and distribution of commodities. While it remains centered upon
the Columbia River (R), the new provisioning process is fundamentally different.
Reproduction of the social relations of production between salmon, indigenous labor,
and the river are no longer necessary for the viability of SPPC . Rather, the relations
between non-indigenous labor (LNI ), a hydroelectric complex (D), and the Columbia
emerge as central to the viability of the new system going forward. Accordingly, the
relations that govern the production and distribution of the surplus are determined on
the basis of the institutional fabric in which the economy is embedded. In the Pacific
Northwest white settlers were granted property rights at the expense of previous
institutions governing communal use. Salmon is now produced within the machine
process, but as a ‘non-basic’ good, following Sraffa’s (1960) classification for which
goods must necessarily be reproduced to ensure viability. Ceremonial attachment to
Columbia River salmon notwithstanding, whether LI may access such surplus salmon
depends upon sufficient monetary claims or the right to fish granted by the legal
framework. While a relationship between Northwest Indians, the Columbia River
and its fish still exists, it is mediated by the capitalist-controlled machine process and
lies peripheral to the provisioning process in general.
In the modern era the industrial economy determines, largely, the process by
which the river-region relationship is socially constructed to reflect the view that the
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Columbia ought to serve as a hydrological engine. The Federal Columbia River Power
System (FRCRPS) emerges as a set of multi-purpose dams that have transformed
the once free-flowing Columbia into a series of slow moving lakes. The Bonneville
Power Administration, in concert with the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau
of Reclamation operate the Columbia so that it functions, to use Richard White’s
language, as an “Organic Machine” (1996). The organic machine rationalizes and
governs an electric utility industry that emerged from the capitalist development of
the region. Because we are interested in the question of qualitative change in the
provisioning process in relation to the Columbia River, we enter the economic history
of the region by tracing the electrification of the region through its railroad roots
and examine how the men that built and controlled these institutions acted in an
institutional capacity, while embedded in a social fabric.
The Essays
The dissertation is comprised of three independent essays. However, each essay
examines the process of qualitative change in the provisioning process from a different
vantage, while remaining fixed in relation to the Columbia River. Among the three
essays the period 1866 to 1945 is covered. The first essay (Chapter 2) examines
development of the region’s railroad system, and the aspirations on the part of its
financiers to realize speculative gains. The region is situated in the context of the
post Civil War imperial stance of the state, and the rise of global finance. It is argued
that while other colonial processes had operated in the region since the arrival of the
fur trappers, construction of railroads embodied a watershed in the commitment for
absentee owners to engage in transformational development.
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The second essay (Chapter 3) traces the emergence of the electric utility glob-
ally, and in reference to the Pacific Northwest. It is argued that the electric utility
emerges directly from the railroad - finance nexus. Key social relationships are ex-
plored that explain the emergence of the electric utility as a going concern, with
particular emphasis placed upon Henry Villard. Villard’s financial connections were
instrumental in establishing the markets in which Edison’s patents would become suc-
cessful in general. In reference to the Pacific Northwest, Villard’s relationship with
Edison, both social and pecuniary in nature, would shape the subsequent process of
electrification for the region.
The third essay (Chapter 4) argues that transformation of the Columbia River
basin into a hydrological machine emerges as a response to the abuses of the electric
utilities. Development of the basin for power, navigation, and irrigation were viewed
as a means by which the inhabitants of the region might break the colonial yoke under
which the utilities absentee owners had placed them. Private utilities had squandered
the wealth embodied in the social technology, failing to provision inhabitants of the
region with electricity uniformly at a fair rate. Utilities at the base of a holding
company pyramid were used to extract surplus incomes from ratepayers, in part,
by inflating their rate bases. Moreover, private utilities wielded political power and
worked to undermine efforts to institute municipal or public power projects. Such
tension was felt regionally and nationally, galvanzing a countervailing force capable of
ushering in large-scale, public, hydroelectric projects. Notwithstanding the dreams of
New Deal planners, the Organic Machine would be placed into the narrower service
of powering the WWII aluminum plant.
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CHAPTER 2
OF RAILROADS AND FINANCE
Introduction
To those unacquainted with the business enterprise of the late nineteenth cen-
tury it would appear the development of market society in the Pacific Northwest is the
stuff of tall tales. The exploits of early railroad promoters is littered with chicanery
and fraud, and reads like a farce by Mark Twain1. Yet these men of railroads and
finance were real and through their persistent failure influenced a process of change
from which emerged a qualitatively distinct provisioning process. Whereas prior to
investment on the part of the modern business enterprise in extractive industries,
e.g., fur trapping, fishing, logging, mining, and later a rationalized transportation
and navigation system, the provisioning process was oriented towards a fundamen-
tally different sort of society. For roughly 9,000 years humans inhabiting the region
have employed a provisioning process that places salmon at the center of its valu-
ation process, organizing its institutional fabric in such a way that provides for its
reproduction as a viable economic system. The economy was embedded in a set of
communal social relations, oriented towards the ceremonial reproduction of Columbia
River salmon runs.
With the arrival of Western settlers, a new articulation of the social relations of
1For an example of the ambiguity between story and reality in this regard, see
Twain’s, The Gilded Age (1874).
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production began to emerge, initiating a sequence of events that would ultimately lead
to the transformation of the provisioning process as whole: the emergence of an eco-
nomic system that placed absentee ownership at the center of the institutional fabric
while moving non-capitalist forms of social integration to the periphery2. Throughout
the process the Columbia River basin remains central to the emerging social order,
where navigation and transportation, together with its tributary markets, would con-
tinue to tie humans to the watershed. Yet, to effect the transformation of the regional
economy into a fully rationalized machine process, required control over markets and
the mighty Columbia River. The process of rationalization3 is was rather abrupt: in
less than a century the region was transformed from a traditional society4 organized
around a set of customs that directly or indirectly bear some relevance to the problem
of reproducing Columbia River salmon runs, to the corporate economy which more
or less resembles what we see today.
2Richard White in Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern
America (2011), emphasizes that through their failures in the construction of their
railroads, as judged from either financial solvency or technological serviceability, the
corporate managers and directors of the railroads managed to usher in a radical
transformation of the relationship between the economic and the social.
3Rationalization is used here in the same context as the Continental experience,
especially Germany, in which industries are organized for the sake of control.
4The term “traditional society” is not without difficulty. It is not employed here
to refer to a natural, idyllic state in which social relations are essentially harmonious.
To do so would commit the analysis to the same teleological error for which criticisms
are leveled against the Social Darwinists of the late 19th century. Rather, we follow
Polanyi’s (1944) scheme by which to compare the onset of market society characterized
chiefly by the advent of fictitious commodities as central mediating processes in the
social fabric, with a general process in which social intercourse was conducted on the
basis of custom and tradition.
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The process of transformation was neither accidental nor passive. Capitalism
did not emerge spontaneously in the region as the result of the heroism of a Turnerian
“rugged individual”5. To the contrary, the region was brought under the control
of institutions, and persons acting in an institutional capacity, embedded in a set
of social networks that reflected the power of corporate finance. These networks
were centered on the great financial centers of the U.S. East, London and Germany.
Further, the outcomes of the capitalist transformation of the West, and the Pacific
Northwest in particular, were not unrelated to the process of imperialism.
Manifest Destiny and the Ideology of Imperialism
William G. Robbins, in Colony and Empire (1994), criticizes the traditional
view of the settling of the West (after Frederic Jackson Turner) as ahistorical and
teleological. The object of Robbins’s criticism reflects the ideology of imperialism.
Envisioning the West as empty or Eden6, or as “the last refuge for man and God”
in this mythical garden “where woe and wail would be no more,” is fraught with
the bastard evolutionary approach of a Herbert Spencer or William Graham Sumner
(Robbins, 1994, pg. 6). Of course the West was not empty; that we view the West
as empty is suggestive of the racism embedded in the legitimating ideology of im-
perialism. The appeal to settle the west for God’s chosen people presupposes those
already inhabiting the region were not people at all. Encapsulating the aborigine
within nature and pitting the Anglo-Saxon, Christian individual against nature, situ-
5See Frederick Jackson Turner’s, The Significance of the Frontier in American
History (1921).
6See Robbins (1998), for a criticism of the Willamette Valley in Oregon as Eden.
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ates the imperialist history of the West within the broader cannon of Western thought
(Sahlins, 2008).
A critical appraisal of the development of market society in the West ought
to take into account the interrelatedness between the rise of business enterprise in
the credit economy7, and the movement toward imperialism. To this end, Robbins
writes:
critical to understanding new bursts in economic growth is a recogni-
tion of the evolving dialectic between changes in world capitalism and
local conditions. Hence, there are obvious social and regional con-
tradictions in the development of the United States, conditions - that
resemble the relationship between an imperial center and a dominated
periphery (1994, pg. 15 ).
Historians such as Robbins, seeking to reinterpret the historiography of the
West through a class-analytic or core-periphery framework have, not surprisingly,
been dismissed as substituting ideology for evidence. Robbins counters by pointing
out that “all interpretations are political in their potential for shaping myth”(1994,
pg. 6), rejecting the very positivism that plagues the social sciences in general and
economics in particular. For Robbins, not unlike many heterodox economists, the
rejection of positivism is linked with the struggle against imperialism as it is un-
derstood as both process of oppression in ways of doing economics and its very real
manifestation as violent expression of power.
7The term “credit economy” follows Veblen in his characterization of the modern
provisioning process animated by pecuniary ends, similar to Keynes’ “monetary pro-
duction economy” and the value circuit in Marx. The choice of Veblen’s terminology
follows from the desire to situate the analysis in the context of the business enter-
prise, as Veblen knew it, as the contradictions associated with its existence as a going
concern bear on the economic life of the community.
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To ignore the centrality of imperialism in our interpretation of the history of
capitalist development in the West obscures the violence embedded in its historical
transformation. To conceal this violence requires a legitimating ideology that relies
upon the fraudulent claims of a) the existence of a timeless, invariant human nature
(Henry, 2012) and b) the proposition that inequality among socially constructed racial
categories is an inherent feature of the progressive development of the human species
(Briffault, 1936).
To illustrate the ideological framework placing the chief institutions of capi-
talism at the center of the institutional fabric, thereby justifying their preeminence in
the social valuation process, it is useful to draw upon John Fiske (2003, pg. 65) who
lauds the natural and “gradual transfer of the preponderance of physical strength
from the hands of the war-loving portion of the human race into the hands of the
peace-loving portion.” For Fiske, it is a mark of progress to place power, “into the
hands of the dollar-hunters, if you please, but out of the hands of the scalp-hunters.”
Fiske apologizes for the ethnic cleansing of so-called “scalp-hunters” through his im-
plicit assumption that genocide simply clears the path for the expansion of American
empire, whose inhabitants of Christian, Anglo-Saxon descent represent the highest
stage of development for the individual.
Clearing the way for the free development of the American individual requires
the extermination of those racially inferior native inhabitants. On behalf of the
imperialism that effected the capitalist transformation of the West, Fiske (2003, pg.
69) suggests that, “[war] as we have seen, is with barbarous races both a necessity
and favorite occupation; as long as civilization comes into contact with barbarism it
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remains a too frequent necessity; but as between civilized and Christian nations it is
an absurdity.” Such is the price of progress.
Fiske’s ideology of imperialism provides an apology for the centralized power of
a federal state enmeshed with the corporate business community: that which advances
the interests of the capitalist class advances the public purpose of peace and progress.
In the process, which is a violent parallel to the transition from feudalism to capitalism
in Europe, the provisioning process was remade; the extant tribal relations centered
upon a ceremonially encapsulated working relationship with the Columbia River, in
which reproduction of the salmon runs dominated the social valuation process, were
displaced and moved to the periphery of an emerging set of relations that placed the
functioning of the machine process at its center.
According to Robbins (1994, pg. 7), avoidance of the American exceptionalism
that has plagued histories of the West in the 20th century, requires confrontation with
the subject as a study of conflict and change. The critical approach stands in sharp
relief to the harmonious, peaceable qualities of the history of a Fiske or Turner. For
Robbins this involves reconciling the historical narrative with a critical understanding
of capitalism as it constitutes “a set of values and perceptions associated with that
[capitalism] phenomenon, its structural framework as expressed in social and political
relations, and its pervasive reach through American life” (1994, pg. 7).
The remainder of the essay follows Robbins as it endeavors to construct a
narrative of the transformation of the region that explicates the power of embedded
persons in bringing the new machine process to bear on the community. It is shown
that the transformation was a process of integrating the region into the capitalist
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system, albeit as periphery to the financial core in Europe and the U.S. East.
Henry Villard and the Social Construction of the Pacific Northwest
In the Pacific Northwest the development process follows Henry Villard’s own
movement within corporate capitalism and the spaces it creates8. Because he was
vested with the authority to take action on behalf of German bondholders, who had
by 1873 assumed the bulk of $11 million in claims on the Oregon and California Rail-
road Company between themselves and English financial houses, Villard was able
to exert his influence through a range of social networks, making his efficacy greater
than if it were examined in isolation (Hedges, 1930; Villard, 1944; Wilkins, 1989). Vil-
lard occupied a central position in financial networks that linked Frankfurt-on-Main,
Berlin, London, New York, and Boston. Villard’s role in the financial network was to
directly manage the affairs of the concerns engaged in railroad construction, with the
purpose of making such concerns financially viable. Through Villard’s attempts to
control the transportation situation, to rationalize it, the Pacific Northwest remains
tied to a legacy in which its identity is defined by the boundaries of the very markets
that Villard helped to establish.
To better understand the role of Villard as an embedded person in the emerg-
ing class of corporate financiers and railroaders, let us consider in some detail the
8White has argued that one of the outcomes of the transcontinental railroads was
a reconstruction of our sense of space and time. The once familiar spaces of the pre-
modern era, insofar as modernity is associated with the advent of the machine process,
are rendered unfamiliar as a result of the always shifting relative spaces created by
changing rate structures. The closing of the frontier by steam power contorts time
and brings forth a new spatial situation, ultimately necessitating the need for a new,
spatial politics. (2011, pp. 140-174)
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early history of the transportation system in Oregon prior to his arrival in 1874 and
subsequent dealings. It will be shown that Villard, acting on behalf of the protection
of the bondholding class in Europe, emerges as an agent of power in effecting the
development of the region. The social fabric, consisting of relations between debtor
and creditor, reflecting the pecuniary nature of its institutions, provided the situation
in which power becomes something to be leveraged by the acting person embedded
therein. As John Commons (1936) would put it, the social fabric in which Villard
was embedded allowed for the expansion of his individual action.
Albro Martin argues, “No other single factor contributed so much to the set-
tlement of the North American continent, to the rapid development of its natural and
human resources, and to the transformation of the material and cultural aspects of
American life as the maturing railroad system” (quoted in Wilkins, 1989, pg. 190).
Following the speculative euphoria resulting from the desire to promote the develop-
ment of a transcontinental railway in early 1860s, an association of capitalists centered
in the Sacramento Valley in California organized the California and Oregon Railroad
Company in 1863 (Ganoe 1924; Hedges 1930, pg. 7; Villard 1944). The Association
of the Upper Sacramento Valley and Southwestern Oregon, in conjunction with other
private Californian interests and the California delegation lobbied Congress seeking
similar claims on the public largesse similar to those granted to the Central and Union
Pacific railroads (Villard, 1944, pg. 1).
While failing to obtain direct subsidizes, The California and Oregon managed
to secure passage of legislation on July 25th, 1866, that conferred upon the concern
the right to secure franchises in Oregon and California. The franchises provided for
21
land grants - twenty alternating sections per mile on either side of the road (Villard,
1944, pg. 1). With the legal framework in place, the associates acting through their
newly established corporation sought to secure the franchise in Oregon9.
What remains of this brief historical sketch concerns the importance of fraud in
conditioning the manner in which economic relations were established and reproduced.
The social networks in which these railroaders were embedded were, in large part,
constructed on the basis of fraudulent claims and practices, serving to condition the
reproduction of fraudulent behavior going forward. The conditions enabling Villard
to emerge as a central force in the development of the region were closely related to
the financial structures that emerged as the result of the fraud. Once established
these financial relations between the railroad concerns and Eastern and European
financiers required ongoing fraud to remain viable.
While the California and Oregon Railroad Company expired as a going con-
cern, the social networks that birthed it remained. On September 3rd, 1866, the
Associates of the Sacramento Valley, of whom Alpheus Bull, C. Temple Emmet and
Simon G. Elliot were most active, entreated a group of Oregon based capitalists to
join in a scheme to secure the Oregon franchise (Villard, 1944, pg. 2). The Oregonians
to whom the Californians appealed for support were well connected to the political
Establishment in Oregon, and would be well placed to influence positive legislation
in favor of the Californians.
9The California and Oregon did claim the California franchise. However, it failed
in raising the sufficient funds to actually begin construction of the road. It was
immediately absorbed by the Central Pacific.
22
That the Oregonians did not initiate the drive for railroad development in
Oregon may be explained, in part, by the fact that Portland based interests were well
represented by the influential Oregon Steamship Navigation Company, a successful
shipping concern with a monopoly over traffic along the Columbia River10. Portland,
Oregon enjoyed pre-eminence at the center of a lucrative trade that extended into the
Inland Empire (the region east of the Cascade Mountains in Oregon, Washington and
extending into Idaho via the Snake River Valley). Prior to the arrival of the Northern
Pacific and the Great Northern Railroads in the Puget Sound, Portland’s location at
the confluence of the Columbia River and Willamette Rivers resulted in its supremacy
in trade. As Hedges (1930, pg. 6) puts it, “The officials of the Navigation Company,
growing wealthy through the river traffic were quite indifferent to the question of
railroad promotion, which they were not disposed to encourage with either financial
or moral support, lest their control of water transportation in the Columbia Basin
should be endangered by railway competition.”
However, despite vested interests in Portland advances by the California inter-
ests would upset their complacency. The memorandum addressed to the Oregonians
mentioned above offered to:
10Not all Oregonians were created the same. The Oregonians indifferent to the
railroad fever of the period are more aptly “Portlanders”, who were vested in their
interest with the Columbia shipping trade. However, as a result of gold strikes in
Southern Oregon, in the Rogue River valley in particular, cities such as Roseburg,
Oregon were more aligned with interests in the Sacramento Valley and sought to
establish firmer market relations in San Francisco, and effectively redirect the flow
of trade southerly through its burgs. For these reasons Elliott was successful in
subscribing support from the Southern Oregon interests for his California & Oregon
scheme (Ganoe, 1924; Lichatowich, 1999)
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build and equip the road for a company to be formed under Oregon
laws according to the stated specifications, for a bonus of $2,000,000
of preferred stock to the California & Oregon Company and $35,000
for every mile of completed and equipped, provided that the General
Incorporation Act of the state could be so amended as to authorize
the issue of $16,000,000 of share capital (including the $2,000,000
preferred for the company), together with a corporate existence of
fifty years, and provided that financial aid from the state and any
other procurable legislative favors be obtained (Villard, 1944, pg. 2;
parenthesis in the original).
The signatories to the memorandum enclosed a confidential covenant which
laid out the terms by which the Oregon party would be compensated for the necessary
bribery expenses to persuade their friends in the legislature:
The California & Oregon Company in consideration of the expense
to be incurred in obtaining the necessary legislation in Oregon to ac-
complish the results named in the foregoing memorandum agree with
the company to be incorporated of citizens of Oregon to assign back
to said company, as they may designate, $1,000,000 of the $2,000,000
preferred stock stipulated to be conveyed to them (Villard, pg. 2).
The two parties failed to strike an agreeable contract, despite considerable hig-
gling and haggling over the terms proposed by the Californians, as conveyed through
an exchange of letters (Villard, 1944, pg. 6). That the offer was not rejected out
of hand suggests the Portlanders did not find it to be a breach of good conduct; to
the contrary, bribery was commonplace as a means by which establish and control
markets during the Gilded Age11.
Other efforts were underway to secure the land grant established by the Act
of July 25th 1866. Joseph Gaston, an earlier associate of S. G. Elliot and therefore
11White (2011) argues that corporate interests did not see it is bribery, but rather
the price of maintaining “friendship” with their counterparts in the state.
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connected to the California party, had spent the month of September 1866 organizing
a concern with the aim of securing the Oregon land grant and right of way to construct
the line from Portland to California (Ganoe, 1924, pg. 250). On October 6th, 1866,
Gaston delivered the articles of incorporation to the Oregon Secretary of State for
filing, which would establish the Oregon Central Railroad Company as the concern
with legal claim to the grant; however, the Secretary had provisionally endorsed the
articles on the understanding Gaston would return with additional signatories from
the Portland interests (Ganoe, 1924, pg. 250)12. Gaston did succeed in recruiting
the support of key Portland capitalists, especially those vested in the Oregon Steam
Navigation Company, but not before some defected and filed for incorporation for
a competing concern under the same name13. The defecting incorporators - most
notably I. R. Moores, J. S. Smith, and E. N. Cooke - filed two days prior to Gaston,
who upon return from Portland had nullified the previously endorsed date of October
6th as a result of substantial changes to the articles of incorporation for the Oregon
12The early incorporators were not united in their support for Gaston; interests
were split over the preferred survey. Two surveys were conducted in the early 1860s,
one led by Gaston that would proceed north to Portland via the Tualatin Valley and
another led by Elliot that would run through the Willamette Valley. The California
interests were more closely enmeshed with the Southern Oregon interests, whom
favored the Willamette route.
13Much of the struggle between these two factions stems from the fact that on
October 10th, 1866, the Oregon legislature, in establishing the legal basis for the
franchise and land grants, named the Oregon Central Railroad Company specifically
as the concern to effect the law. The law was enacted in favor of Gaston, however,
due to disagreements among his fellow incorporators after the law had been enacted
Gaston’s control over the name was no longer assured. Here lies a clear example of
the importance of goodwill capital in shaping the course of economic affairs, as well
as instructive to the manner in which it emerges from the institutional fabric.
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Central Railroad Company.
Ganoe points out that “the company of November 17th, 1866, was not orga-
nized for the purpose of building a railroad, but to beat out Gaston since the capital
stock was only placed at $500,000” (1924, pg. 251); a notable example of the problems
associated with the degrees of separation inherent to the modern business enterprise,
as it is controlled by persons acting in a pecuniary interest whose interests diverge
from the those of the community at large (Dean, 2013; Veblen, 1904).
Yet another Oregon Central would be incorporated, this time with the suffix
“of Salem” on April 22nd, 1867, by J. H. Moores, I. R. Moores, J. S. Smith, George
L. Woods, E. N. Cooke, S. Ellsworth, and S. A. Clarke14. Clarke, Cooke and Smith
were among the Oregonians to whom the first offer to join with the California party
was made, effected chiefly by Elliot. Villard recounts that, “J. S. Smith, who also had
knowledge of the California & Oregon Company scheme, accidentally met S. G. Elliot
early in April 1867 in San Francisco. They discussed the railroad outlook in Oregon,
and, as Elliot spoke very confidently of his business connections and ability to control
capital for carrying out a construction project on the lines of proposal submitted
[referring to the Willamette Valley survey in the articles of November 17th], Smith
urged him to go to Oregon and provided him with a letter of introduction to I. R.
Moores” (1944, pg. 3).
Given Smith’s prior knowledge of the memorandum of September 3rd, 1866,
14I. R. Moore was the Assistant Secretary of State at the time Gaston filed, albeit
unfinished, articles of incorporation. Moore asked to see the articles and upon learning
that they were not physically on file in the Secretary’s office, he moved to preempt
Gaston (Ganoe, 1924, pg. 251).
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it is unlikely that his meeting with Elliot was accidental. A more convincing account
would have Smith travelling to San Francisco to seek out Elliot for the purpose of
renewing the previously aforementioned offer so that the road could actually be built,
thereby cementing claim to the land grant. Nevertheless, Elliot did travel to Oregon
on Smith’s advice to meet with I. R. Moores and defrauded him and his associates
into believing that he represented the interest of capitalists in California and the East
(Ganoe, 1924, pg. 251). Passing himself off as ‘attorney-in-fact’ for Albert J. Cook,
whom Elliot claimed to be a wealthy railroad contractor from the East, he managed
to connect himself with the fate of the concern and continue to defraud his fellow
owners and managers in the enterprise, his suppliers, and his financiers, ultimately
undermining the viability of the going concern (Ganoe 1924, passim; Villard, 1944).
The chief fraud lied in the fact that Albert J. Cook never existed. Elliot would
continue operating on false pretense until he was pushed out by Ben Holladay, the
stagecoach magnate, who had grown wealthy as a result of his contractual relationship
with the Union Army during the Civil War. Holladay managed to dump his assets on
Wells Fargo prior the decline of the stagecoach as a financially viable transportation
technology, freeing him to pursue an interest in the very railroads that replaced it
(Hedges, 1930; Villard, 1944).
Prior to the discovery of Elliot’s fraudulent practices, the outcomes of his ef-
forts to enrich himself at the expense of the going concern had the effect of stitching
together two social networks: one based in the Sacramento Valley and another in
Oregon serving the Willamette Valley interests. To this end, Elliot was central in
the emerging corporate finance and railroad networks. Unfortunately for Elliot, de-
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frauding fellow business partners was a breach of acceptable conduct in the corporate
community, thus tainting his associations with the pall of poor worthiness. It would
require Ben Holladay’s name to place the “Eastside” Oregon Central Company in
good standing with the bondholders, so that it could obtain the funds necessary for
its reproduction as a concern15.
Villard (1944, pg. 15) argues that Holladay, having been previously interested
in the Union Pacific and the Credit Mobilier, was keen to the riches that await those
successful in laying claim to public lands and subsidies. Holladay was confident
that with his lobbying experience and financial connections, obtaining control of the
railroad concerns in the region would afford him the basis from which to secure
the land grant. In September of 1868, Emmet and Holladay, who had known each
other from previous associations, met with Elliot and convinced him to relinquish his
controlling stake in the company. On September 12th, 1868, control of the Eastside
company passed into the hands of Holladay.
Immediately Holladay mobilized his lobbying efforts in conjunction with his
ownership of the local press to persuade the public opinion in favor of the Eastside
company. Holladay was successful: In October, 1868, the Oregon legislature annulled
the previous language that, two years prior, placed the land grant in favor of the
Westside company of Gaston and associates. Unable to secure finance for the con-
struction of the road, the Gaston interests sold out to Holladay in 1870. Subsequently,
15This is not to suggest that Holladay was not himself a fraud. In fact, Holladay
would later be removed by Villard and the Frankfort Committee for failing to make
regular coupon payments in full on the bonds
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Holladay incorporated a new concern to consolidate his interests: On March 17th,
1870, the Oregon and California Railroad Company was formed under Oregon law
(Hedges, 1930, pp. 8-9).
Ganoe remarks (1924), “we see how the early political history of Oregon was
connected with the railroads. Holladay had bought and subsidized papers as well as
politicians. Not only that, by such a plan [Gaston plan] the whole of Southern Oregon
would be cut out of a great deal of traffic. It must be remembered that Southern Ore-
gon since the gold rush of ’49 had not been an insignificant factor16.” Such politicians
included the likes of John H. Mitchell and Joseph N. Dolph, each connected directly
with the railroad - finance nexus. According to Dorothy O. Johansen and Charles
M. Gates (1967), Senator Mitchell remarked, “Ben Holladay’s politics are my politics
and what Ben Holladay wants I want.” Of course, the politician also served as legal
counsel to both the newly formed Oregon and California Railroad and the Northern
Pacific, and had been an original incorporator of the Oregon Central (Johansen and
Gates, 1967, pg. 351). Senator Dolph, Johansen and Gates observe:
was also vice-president of the Oregon and Transcontinental Company
[a holding company that Villard would later organize to govern the
joint interests of the Northern Pacific and Oregon and California]
and hence was linked not only with the interests of every important
railroad in Oregon and Washington but with timber and mining in-
terests as well. State legislators bought by the railroads were vigilant
in warding off public scrutiny of freight rates, and in defeating every
effort to establish effective regulatory agencies.
By 1872 Holladay had constructed the road from Portland as far south as
16Cf. Lichatowich, 1999, pp. 52 - 80, for discussion of early mining interests in the
Rogue River Valley, in the context of its impact on the viability of a salmon-based
economy.
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Roseburg (roughly 180 miles). However, in order to finance the construction of the
road Holladay relied upon extensive issues of bonds. To place these bonds Holladay
leveraged his close relationship with Milton S. Latham, president of the London and
San Francisco Bank, who managed to organize a syndicate that joined the English and
German financial circles (Hedges, 1930, pg. 9; Villard, 1944, pp. 30 - 34)17. Latham’s
success in placing the bonds was due, in part, by his centrality in international finance,
explaining why despite limited knowledge of Oregon in European financial networks,
“little difficulty was encountered in disposing of the bonds” (Hedges, 1930, pg. 10).
The remoteness of the relationship between creditor and debtor in this circumstance,
however, created the opportunity for deceit (Hedges, 1930, pg. 10)18.
There was significant foreign investment in American railroads from the 1870s
through to 1915 (Wilkins, 1989, pp 191 - 236). German financial houses took a
considerable interest in the bond issues of the Oregon and California R.R. Co, so that
by 1872 they had accumulated $11,000,000 in gold bonds (Buss, 1978; Hedges, 1930;
Villard, 1944; Wilkins, 1989). However, Holladay had failed to invest the borrowed
17It is important to note that, in the main, railroad bonds were only salable on the
understanding they were undergirded by land grants and subsidies. Further, their
value depended upon the perceived creditworthiness of the personalities involved,
which is evidenced by the fact that once news broke of Elliot’s A. J. Cook fraud, any
bonds he wished to sell were worthless.
18Distance takes on both a social and geospatial meaning. Obviously, Europe and
the Pacific Northwest are quite removed - a distance of several thousand miles. But,
social distance possesses meaning in the network context. Holladay was one degree
removed from the German bondholders that would ultimately wrest control from him
upon learning of his deceit. His deceit through Latham, who was adjacent to the
bondholders, served to place Holladay at arm’s length of the bondholders, placing
enough distance between Holladay and his creditors to enable his deceit.
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funds in a manner that best supported the viability of the concern to reproduce
itself, relying instead on the view he would always be able to borrow more funds to
service his outstanding liabilities19. Of course, Holladay had assured the bondholders
that the fundamental business of the railroad was sound, securing the basis for his
favorable credit terms. Holladay’s deceit, as well as that of his predecessor, S. G.
Elliot, combined with failure to complete the road per the language of the franchise,
contributed to realized losses in the capitalized value of the assets in the Oregon &
California Railroad.
Bondholder Response
Default of railroad bonds was common during the period (Wilkins, 1989, pp.
191 - 236). The conventional response to default was the formation of bondholder
protection committees. In Frankfort-on-Main, the Committee for the Protection of
the Bondholders of Oregon and California 7% Bonds was established. In 1873 the
Committee dispatched an agent, Dr. Paul Reinengum, to survey the situation in Ore-
gon; Reinengum discovered that bondholders had been misled. The Pacific Northwest
19It is unclear to what extent Holladay was to blame for the default on the Oregon
and California bonds. MacColl (1976) describes Holladay as exemplary of the habit of
conspicuous consumption, which suggests Holladay used his control over the enterprise
to plunder its cash balances for his own enrichment. Villard’s (1944) account supports
this view. However, the lifeblood of any railroad during this period - especially those
aspiring to the status of major regional trunk or transcontinental - was easy money.
Judged on the basis of sound finance the Western railroads were always a losing
venture, with perhaps James J. Hill’s Great Northern as notable exception. The
crucial distinction lies in whether or not the persons engaged in managing, financing,
or “undertaking” the railroad venture were well connected or central to the dominant
financial networks prevalent at the time.
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lacked the necessary markets to sustain sufficient financial flows to at least service its
debts, which had the effect of rendering the bonds worthless. Ganoe points out that
at best the bonds paid 2 or 3 percent, which gave the Germans cause for panic.
In the interest of sustaining the value of the bonds the Committee charged
Henry Villard with managing the affairs of the Oregon & California directly. Due
to the inability of Holladay to honor the terms of the bondholder oversight, Villard,
on behalf of the bondholders, sought control of the Oregon & California by buying
Holladay out of his other interests in navigation and railroading in the region. In this
they were successful (Hedges, 1930; Villard, 1944, Wilkins, 1989).
Villard’s activities thenceforth would have lasting effects on the development
of the provisioning process in the region. His consolidation of the regional trans-
portation system, including the Oregon Steam Navigation Company, was part of a
process in which Villard sought to actively develop capitalist development in the re-
gion, by joining the shipping hub at Portland with the emerging Northern Pacific.
Following his arrival in Oregon in 1874, Villard would rationalize the transportation
situation in the region through a process of market governance. Engaging his friends
in a “blind pool,” Villard secured sufficient subscriptions to finance the consolidation
of the Oregon Central Railroad, Oregon and California Railroad, Oregon Steamship
Company and Oregon Steamship Navigation Company into the Oregon Railway and
Navigation Company. In doing so, Villard gained control over the region-wide trans-
portation and navigation system (Buss, 1978; Hedges, 1930; Villard, 1944), allowing
him to integrate the system with the encroaching transcontinental: the Northern
Pacific Railroad.
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Recall, the Oregon Steamship Navigation Company controlled the market for
river traffic in the Columbia River basin, which a connection with the Northern Pacific
would undermine. Villard, recognizing that the viability of the Northern Pacific, a
concern he eventually controlled and for whom he represented the interests of the
bondholding class in Europe, required a longer planning horizon than that of the
Navigation Company, sought control to preclude any potential steamship - railroad
rate wars that may ensure.
Thus, a problem faced Villard: in order for the transportation system to re-
main viable, in the financial sense, the liability structures that emerged with them
required validation. Financial validation required markets. Commodity production
for sale on the world market was necessary to make the emerging machine process ra-
tional, because the scale and scope of local markets was insufficient to generate a flow
of income to the railroad. In an effort to resolve this issue, Villard, like his contem-
poraries in the railroading business and finance, engaged in a propaganda campaign
aimed at convincing a mass population to immigrate to the Pacific Northwest in order
to bring about markets, and to serve as a ready supply of labor power. To this end,
Villard actively promoted migration to the Pacific Northwest in Europe (Buss, 1978,
pp. 143-147).
Ideology, Immigration, and Imperialism
The process of immigration, promotion of railroads, and the development of
an ideology of imperialism are interconnected themes. Villard was secretary to the
American Social Science Association in 1865. During his tenure as secretary he was
very active in promoting their mission which included:
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the development of Social Science, and to guide the public mind to
the best practical means of promoting the Amendment of Laws, the
Advancement of Education, the Prevention and Repression of Crime,
the Reformation of Criminals, and [sic] the progress of Public Moral-
ity, the diffusion of sound principles on questions of Economy, Trade,
and Finance-It will aim to bring together the various societies and in-
dividuals now interested in these objects, for the purpose of obtaining
by discussion the real elements of Truth; by which doubts are removed,
conflicting opinions harmonized, and a common ground afforded for
treating wisely the great social problems of the day (emphasis added)20
Reflecting on the history of the association, F. B. Sanborn (1909), remarked
“[our] most energetic Secretary was the late Henry Villard, who increased our mem-
bership, got out our Handbook of Immigration, and drew to these shores several
hundred thousand, not to say millions, of those citizens who now govern us in fi-
nance, industry, economics, history, and fiction. I believe I succeeded, [but] nobody
could replace him.”
The significance of this association highlights the fuzzy boundaries between the
properly social and properly economic: the two interests are mutually constitutive.
Villard’s role in promoting settlement performed a threefold function: 1) to attract
immigration from the continent, thereby supporting the development of markets for
the emerging railroad, corporate system; 2) ‘Americanizing’ these immigrants so as
the imbue in them the sense of American exceptionalism; and 3) it offered Villard
entrance to the financial circles which would later become the basis for his ascendancy,
while simultaneously helping to validate those very financial structures.
While Villard’s association with the ASSA may appear unrelated to the central
20Article 2, Constitution of the American Association for the Promotion of Social
Science. 1866.
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issue of explaining the development of the region in particular, and a corporate system
based upon high finance in general, it remains relevant regarding his membership in
what Dorothy Ross, in Origins of American Social Science (1991), refers to as the
“gentry class;” a class that took it upon themselves to lead the development a new
ideology more fit for life under the machine age. The new situation constituted by
finance capitalism, the machine process, and business enterprise in the credit economy,
required a new ideology, wherein the crisis of American exceptionalism might be
avoided and her thrust towards imperialism unimpaired (Ross, 1991, pg. 63)
Villard’s efforts succeeded in linking the Pacific Northwest with the East via
the establishment of financial, social and technological networks. The advent of the
railroad, especially the transcontinentals, had the effect of reorganizing social rela-
tionships of production so that they conformed to the machine process. That is, the
institutional fabric changed to reflect the new technological situation; a situation that
was brought about in the Pacific Northwest, in large part, through the decisions and
behavior a man who directed the chief institutions vested with the power to shape
the nature of the surplus on behalf of his common interest with absentee owners and
the rentier class.
Conclusion
In considering this brief history of the emergence of the corporate form of orga-
nization in the Pacific Northwest we necessarily omit a great deal of detail. However,
at the level of our analysis we have examined how the embedded person - in this case
Henry Villard - may shape the development of the provisioning process to effect a
radical transformation of the institutional fabric. The power to effect change derives
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from the pattern of social relations emerging from the complex interaction of a host
of factors, ranging from the technological to the social; factors which mutually consti-
tute the basis of the “institutional fabric of habitual elements that governs the scheme
of life” (Veblen, 1914). Reducing the analysis to the individual, suggesting that men
of railroads and finance acted in isolation to bring about the rise of the machine age,
ignores the social and historical contingency of power and influence. Henry Villard
does not emerge de novo as an entrepreneurial hero. Rather, Villard was embedded
within a set of networks that constitute the basis of class rule in market society; his
connections to international finance, the social elite, and the state explain his efficacy
to change the situation in the Columbia River basin as any innate qualities he might
have possessed.
In consequence to the advent of the machine process, of which the railroad
serves as object of analysis presently, the social relations of production were rational-
ized. Traditional forms of integration linking the community to the Columbia River
through the labor process, centered around the potlatch and salmon runs, would be
displaced by a set of forces much more powerful than the fixity of ceremony and tradi-
tion. Conceiving of the institutional fabric as a set of mutually constitutive networks
allows us to envision the transformation as a process in which the chief institutions
of the machine process vis-a-vis the credit economy become embedded in the center
of the institutional fabric, while an older set of relations move to the periphery.
The core-periphery concept possesses dual meaning: while the articulation
of social relations were rearranged to place at the center persons and institutions
vested in the capitalist class, the region itself moved into tributary relation to the
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East. In this sense, the Pacific Northwest becomes colony to the financial core of the
world system of capitalism, precisely in proportion as it develops around the machine
process.
Finally, the process of transformation was not inevitable. It required the active
participation of men vested with the right to act in the capacity of institutional power.
The ability to exert influence over the development of new institutions relies upon a
nuanced understanding of the relationship between social structure and the persons
embedded within it. It has been argued in this historical example that the specific
articulation of social relations determines much in the degree to which the acting
person may exert his influence over the affairs of others. Centrality in the network
matters in our understanding of power as an emergent process.
Indeed, the fact remains that changes in the provisioning process are discre-
tionary. Such discretion is distributed in accordance with the hierarchy and inequality
inherent to class society. Class societies are by their definition subject to minority
rule, leaving the question open as to how so few can effectively rule a majority? The
trick is done in part by fraud; a process which is complex and multidimensional, as
we have seen in the intra-class warfare in the case of railroad promoters. However,
the dimension that possesses explanatory power for the present purpose is the fraud
which conceals the violence embodied in imperialism. To bring about a highly cen-
tralized class rule, in which the dictates of the machine process govern the lives of the
mass proportion of its inhabits, in which the traditional working relationship with
the Columbia River as the basis for an ecologically sustainable provisioning process is
forever destroyed, requires concealment of the telos of imperial expansion under the
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cloak of progress.
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CHAPTER 3
THE EMERGENCE OF THE ELECTRIC UTILITY
Introduction
The electric utility emerges from the railroad corporation. It is argued in
this essay that development of the two industries were not independent phenomena.
Rather, the electric utility may be viewed as the lineal descendent of the railroad
corporation, both in legal foundation as well as in common liability structure. One
legacy of the railroads was to establish the basis for a modern system of corporate
law. Given the legal framework for intellectual property (Commons, 1924), and the
manner in which it was financed, electricity would be developed for the world so long
as it could be used as the basis of putative earnings capacity. In the US and Germany,
the development of electricity was held in private hands, and the manner in which it
was produced was determined largely on the basis of controlling markets.
Aside from the theoretical foundations the two industries share, each were tied
to the Columbia River basin. The development of railways in the Pacific Northwest
was the direct outgrowth of a navigation business that emerged from the colonial
extraction of primary commodities from the region1. Steamship traffic along the
Columbia River and its tributaries, once rationalized, formed the basis for the region’s
first great trust: the Oregon Steam Navigation Company (OSN) (Gillette, 1904;
1Lichatowich (1999) provides a broad overview of the early industries of the region,
emphasizing their respective impacts on the viability of salmon reproduction. For a
more detailed historical exposition, see Johansen and Gates (1967).
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Poppleton, 1908). The going business of the OSN became the point of departure for
the railroads of the region, and so the latter finds its roots in the Columbia basin. The
roads themselves were established along the river routes for reasons of technical and
pecuniary expediency. In the PNW, historically, the development of hydroelectric
power was an outcome of the establishment of corporate property in the railroad and
navigation business, however unanticipated.
The Willamette Falls at Oregon City, once recreated as a private, exclusive
space for the generation of financial flows, was the site of the first long distance
generation and transmission of electricity (Hirt, 2012; Robley, 1935; Wollner, 1990).
Its potential as a site of economic importance in the electric utility business is the
result of Henry Villard’s interest in the property, while he was in control of the Oregon
and California Railroad and interested in the development of Edison’s electric light
business. Since Villard was so instrumental in promoting Edison’s work (Buss, 1978),
and since he was vested with the right and authority to act in an institutional capacity
over development of the Columbia River basin, it follows that the development of
railroads in the PNW and the development of electricity are mutually constitutive.
In other words, the emergence of electricity and the manner in which it affects the
development of the social provisioning process in the region is embedded within a
social fabric in which railroad financiers like Henry Villard were central.
This essay seeks to map how the electric utility industry emerges from the
railroads, and considers the descent in terms of its effects on the social fabric as a
whole. It is argued that while the nature of the going plants in the two industries
are considerably different, the pecuniary aspects of the going concern are virtually
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identical. This is not random. Rather, it reflects the fact that however radical the
technological departure in electricity, the social networks that constitute the capi-
talist, corporate class remained largely unaffected. In fact, the new technology was
immediately captured by this class and placed into the service of generating new
flows of profit. Moreover, within the capitalist class, struggles over which method of
producing and delivering electricity were fought in the trade associations, precisely
because each technology implied a different set of value flows. To put it simply, the
central station concept, which is what we have today, emerged in the end not so
much because it was more efficient but because it was more conducive to centralized
corporate control. Since, the electric utility emerges from the same social space as
that which the railroad is embedded, the two are directly related.
Emergence of the Electric Utility
Markets for electricity and electric products emerged toward the close of the
1870’s. At its inception, electricity was developed for use in illumination. On-site or
isolated systems for arc lights were installed as early as 1878. While impractical for
use in the modern experience, arc lights did have the effect of generating a specta-
cle. Bystanders could observe the marvel of an illuminated commercial intersection,
whose source of power was unseen. More marvelous was Edison’s incandescent light,
which did not burn and flicker as the arc light’s carbon filament did when it shone.
The warm, steady glow of the Edison light symbolized a progressive, peaceful and
clean view of the future (Nye, 1990). Homes, streets, and factories could be lit by
a device that safely contained the smoot and smog of the industrial city, keeping it
away from the daily experience of the modern city dweller. And light was just the
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beginning - with electricity the future was ours to make and render submissive. The
first act of controlling Nature through fire was thought to have been completed and
perfected with the electric light. Consistent with the prevailing ideology of the day,
technological achievement enshrined in the electric light was hailed as yet another
step toward to the ascension of man to its teleological end (Spencer, 1851).
By the 1920s electricity had become big business. However, from 1880 to
1925, a period marked by rapid growth, the new industry would settle into instituted
norms concerning the specific manner in which electricity would be provisioned and
for whom it would generate claims on the surplus. A number of possibilities would
be settled: a) the type of technology employed, b) market boundaries, and c) market
governance.
A thoroughgoing analysis of the electric utility industry is not of primary in-
terest to this dissertation. Rather, this essay focuses on the interrelations between
the utility, the railroads, and the Columbia River basin. The electric utility is nearly
indistinguishable from the railroads with respect to the structure, conduct and per-
formance of the going concern. Railroads and utilities rely upon a large compliment
of plant and equipment, and are governed by the same logic of the machine pro-
cess. The goodwill capital in each case emerges from the exclusive right of the going
concern to make claims on the output of this social, machine process. The going
business is governed by the same businessmen, both in class and cohort. The social
networks that controlled the railroads also shaped the development of the electric
utility, by capturing the technology and shaping the development of its initial market
boundaries.
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The Railroad Roots of the Electric Utility
The development of the electric utility mirrors that of the railroads in terms
of the social construction of its markets. Such similarity should not be a surprise
as it is clear that the utility emerges from the same set of networks as the railroads.
Figure 3 provides a glimpse at the extent to which Eastern financiers would direct the
affairs of the railroads. The very financial institutions, and in some cases particular
financiers, went on to develop the electric utilities. Most notable for our purposes
here are J. P. Morgan and Henry Villard.
The House of Morgan was deeply involved with a range of financial matters of
concern to the railroads. Junius Morgan, through George Peabody, had dealt in rail-
road securities during the 1850’s. Pierpont Morgan, with Morgan & Co. and Drexel,
Morgan, acted as financier to the Union Pacific as early as August 1869. Accord-
ing to Vincent Carosso (1987), Morgan’s “long association with the [UP] provides a
good illustration of the many different types of financial transactions with which [the
Morgans] concerned themselves.” Morgan was instrumental in moving the railroad
business toward greater coherence amongst their interconnected balance sheets. In
regards to systemic insolvencies facing railroads in the 1880s, Morgan reorganized
the Philadelphia & Reading, Baltimore & Ohio, and Chesapeake & Ohio systems, to
name a few (Carosso, 1987).
The financial fragility that grew up with the extensive liability issues of the rail-
roads, “gave Morgan the authority to achieve the financial stability and orderly devel-
opment of railroad properties which the ‘gentlemen’s agreements’ had failed to attain”
(Carosso, 1987). J. P. Morgan hosted meetings in December, 1888 and January, 1889
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Figure 2. Financial control of major railroads 1872-1894.
Notes: Node scale is arbitrary. However, large nodes indicate either business enter-
prise or important financiers. Directors: 1. Henry Villard, 2. Frederick Billings, 3.
Jay Gould, 4. Frederick Ames, 5. Oliver Ames, 6. Russel Sage, 7. Sidney Dillon,
8. Thomas Baring, 9. William S. Ladd, 10. William Endicott, Jr. Railroads: Mis-
souri Pacific (MP), Northern Pacific (NP), Atlantic and Pacific (AP), Union Pacific
(UP), Chicago and Northwestern (CNW), Chicago, Burlington and Quincy (CBQ),
Burlington and Missouri (BMRR), Missouri Central (MC), and Atcheson, Topeka
and Sante Fe (ATSF). Constructed based on data by Hanson et al., (2009)
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to discuss the establishment of what would become the Interstate-Commerce Railway
Association (Carosso, 1987; Grodinsky, 1962; White, 2011). Morgan would continue
to dominate the field of finance during the emergence of the electric utility industry,
and would play a central in role its development.
Villard and Edison
The electric utility bears a direct connection to the social networks in which
Villard was embedded, whether we consider the emergence of the industry as a whole
or the PNW in particular (see Figure 3. )
As early as 1879 Villard was in contact with Edison concerning the devel-
opment of electricity for commercial application (Buss, 1978). Villard was an early
stockholder and director in the Edison Electric Light Company. The relationship be-
tween Edison and Villard was first established and introduced through Grosvernor P.
Lowrey, who served as general counsel for the Western Union telegraph, and became
quite acquainted with Thomas Edison as a result of extensive litigation surrounding
the issue of patent infringements (Buss, 1978). Lowrey and Villard met in conjunc-
tion with the Kansas Pacific Railroad having been placed into receivership in 18782.
Given the significant claims on the Kansas Pacific held by Frankfurt bondholders,
Villard was sent to receive the railroad, at which time Buss (1978) suggests the two
likely discussed Edison’s work, who by then was ‘something of a public prodigy for his
invention of the phonograph and stock market printing telegraph.” This connection
proved to be important because it was Lowrey that organized the interests at West-
2For a detailed discussion of the Kansas Pacific failure and its subsequent receiver-
ship, see Julius Grodinsky’s Transcontinental Railway Srategy, 1869-1893 (1962).
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Figure 3. Villard and Edison: 1879-1889
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Oregon 
ern Union to subscribe funds for the incorporation of Edison Electric Light Company
in 1878. This initial capitalization provided for the construction of Edison’s lab at
Menlo Park.
In January, 1880 Villard had plans to join the interests of Edison with those of
the electrical equipment firms in Germany (Buss, 1978). Villard approached Lowrey
to suggest the exploitation of Edison’s patents throughout Europe, to which Lowrey
was amiable3. January 2, 1880 Lowrey wrote Edison to introduce the scheme4. Pro-
vided Lowrey could secure Edison’s support Villard planned to sell rights to Edison’s
patents in Germany, Austria, Russia, France, Italy and Spain for $450,000 in total.
Villard would market these to Jacob Stern, a well-connected Frankfurt banker. While
Stern was less optimistic than Villard he was willing to consider negotiating the sale
of patent rights for Germany and France, provided the inventions that underlie their
patents proved serviceable (Buss, 1978). In another letter dated January 18, 1880,
Lowrey informed Edison that he had arranged for a meeting with Villard regarding
the financing of Edison’s interests in Europe. Lowrey advised Edison, “if you send
him to me I think I can do very well for you...Drexel Morgan and Company were
not liberal enough.5” Indeed domestic financiers during this period, especially with
regards to the emerging electric technology, were more reluctant than their European
3Lowrey to Thomas Alva Edison (TAE), 2 Jan. 1880 (TAED D8026)
4In the letter dated January 2, 1880 Lowrey refers to Villard as “ a gentleman who
is in intimate relations with some of the most important financial people in Germany.”
Since Villard was on the board of directors for Edison Electric Light Company it is
rather strange that he is not referred to by name.
5Lowrey to TAE, 18 Jan. 1880, (TAED D8026)
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counterparts to finance large ventures (Carosso, 1987; McGuire, Granovetter, and
Schwartz, 1993; Wilkins, 1989)6.
While in control of the Oregon Railway and Navigation Company (ORNC),
Villard commissioned the S.S. Columbia and installed an Edison system so that he
may introduce Portland to the possibilities of electric light (Hirt, 2012; Robley, 1935;
Villard, 1904; Wollner, 1990). Villard’s ‘Brilliant Spectacle’, as Paul Hirt terms it,
was the first commercial application of Edison’s system. According to Buss (1978)
“Villard persuaded Edison to design an incandescent lighting system for the vessel
despite the protest of [John Roach, the shipright,] and the objections of the marine
underwriters association who feared a malfunction in the system would set the ship
ablaze.7” Later, Villard would solicit the development of an electric engine for use in
freight rail, as he envisioned electric motors driving the system of feeder lines for the
Northern Pacific.
After Villard’s financial troubles following the downturn of 1883, he focused
more on the process of developing Edison’s central stations (Buss, 1978). Villard
would later organize the Edison General Electric Company, using the financial re-
sources he had cultivated in the Duetsche Bank. Using his connections in interna-
tional financial circles, Villard was able to facilitate investment between Edison and
6This historical example highlights Schumpeter’s (1983) recognition that the
banker “stands between those who wish to form new combinations and the pos-
sessors of productive means,” suggesting a far more central role for the financier than
serving as intermediary. Here we see the banker as ‘ephor’ in historical detail. See
also Minsky (1990) for an analysis of Schumpeter’s theory of finance.
7See also Villard (1904, pg. 290).
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German electric interests. Villard managed to place Edison patents in Germany, as
well as German investment in New York for a cable plant that would serve as an
input into the Edison system domestically.
After Villard’s resignation from the Northern Pacific, resulting from a combi-
nation of mismanagement and tight credit following the recession of 1882, he left for
Europe in the spring of 18848. However, Villard did remain connected with Edison
Electric Light Company during this sojourn. While in Europe he cultivated his fi-
nancial relationships with German bankers, most notably, those connected with the
Deutsche Bank, which included Jacob Stern and Werner Siemens. According to Buss
(1978) it was Villard’s association with Edison that allowed him to establish a business
relationships with Werner Siemens. Werner Siemens, as well as brothers Friedrich,
Karl and Wilhelm, had established considerable interests in the production of electric
cables. In addition, the Siemens brothers had established an inter-European telegraph
network (Buss, 1978). Meanwhile, Siemens and Halske had diversified, financing the
first electric train in 1879. Villard also cultivated a relationship with George Siemens
of the Deutsche Bank beginning a period in which Villard would act as intermediary
for German investment in US interests. See Table 1 delineating Villard’s promotional
work resulting in over $65 million dollars of securities purchased by the Deutsche
8According to Buss (1978) the root of the cause of his downfall in 1883 was due
to his inability to gain access to liquidity. Given the recession of 1882 (March 1882
- May 1885) the position of the Northern Pacific became more fragile, requiring the
further issue of liabilities just to validate its debt structure. Buss (1978) suggests
that internal doubt over the ability of Villard to manage the Northern Pacific led to
reduction in his ability to secure lines of credit. This would ultimately undermine his
control of the NP and cause his exit from the firm.
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Bank in US railroads, and later Edison General Electric.
According to Wilkins (1989) there were two main firms in Germany that
dominated the industry of electrical equipment manufacture. These were Siemens
and Halske and Deutsche Edison Gesellschaft (formed in 1883 by Emil Rathenau).
Deutsche Edison Gesellschaft changed its name in 1887 to Allgemeine Elektrizitats
Gesellschaft (A.E.G). George von Siemens was chairman of the board of A.E.G, and
was also a director at the Deutsche Bank. George von Siemens was a cousin of Werner
von Siemens of Siemens and Halske. Hence, the two firms were connected via fam-
ily relations. Villard was connected to each. Both firms jointly owned patents on
Edison’s technology in Germany, as result of an 1883 accord between the two firms
intended to bring about harmony in the German market (Wilkins, 1989)9.
Villard planned to seize control of Edison interests in America and form the
basis of an international cartel centered in Germany (Wilkins, 1989)10. Returning
to the United States in 1886 Villard acted as representative of the Deutsche Bank,
charged with exclusive production rights for the Siemens cable business (Wilkins,
1989). The idea was that Edison interests in the United States and electric interests
9Siemens and Halske was the largest single shareholder in A.E.G at the time of
its founding. Wilkins (1989) notes that according to Buss (1978) Villard’s sojourn
to Germany in 1884 was “ostensibly to market Edison generating plants.” However,
apparently Villard used “Edison’s name to establish a relationship with Werner von
Siemens of Siemens and Halske and Emil Rathenau of Deutsche Edison Gesellschaft
at the same time renewed his earlier acquaintances with George von Siemens.” In
1887 Villard participated and assisted in the process which transformed Deutsche
Edison into A.E.G, at which time the latter was wholly independent of American
Edison interests.
10For more on the international electricity cartel in question, see Reich (1992)
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Table 1. German Bond Finance in US Concerns: 1886 - 1890
Year Purchaser Issuer Amount
1886 Deutsche Bank; Jacob
Stern
Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton $2,500,000
1887 Deutsche Bank Northern Pacific $6,000,000
1887 Deutsche Bank Oregon Railway & Navigation Co. $3,500,000
1887 Deutsche Bank Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton $2,166,000
1887 Jacob Stern; Speyer,
Ellison & Co
Denver and Rio Grande $1,500,000
1887 Deutsche Bank & Ja-
cob Stern
Missouri Pacific $1,500,000
1887 Deutsche Bank; Hei-
delback, Ickelheimer
& Co. Rothchild
Northern Pacific $5,000,000
1887 Jacob Stern Illinois Central Mortgage $5,000,000
1888 Deutsche Bank Northern Pacific $10,000
1888 Deutsche Bank Chesepeake & Ohio $1,600,000
1888 Deutsche Bank Oregon Railway & Navigation Co. $1,750,000
1888 Deutsche Bank;
Speyer, Ellison & Co.
Houston & Texas Central $2,000,000
1889 Deutsche Bank Wisconsin Central $250,000
1889 Deutsche Bank Northern Pacific $500,000
1889 Deutsche Bank Houston & Texas Central $2,418,000
1889 Deutsche Bank; Jacob
Stern
Northern Pacific & Manitoba RR $50,000
1889 Muller, Shall & Co.;
Speyer, Ellison & Co.
Northern Pacific & Manitoba RR $100,000
1889 Muller, Shall & Co. Edison General Electric $100,000
1889 AEG Edison General Electric $3,800,000
1889 Siemens and Halske Edison General Electric $4,000,000
1889 Deutsche Bank Edison General Electric $750,000
1889 Deutsche Bank;
Speyer, Ellison & Co.
Central Pacific $3,250,000
1889 Heidelback, Ickel-
heimer & Co.
Wisconsin Central $22,000
1889 Speyer, Ellison & Co. Wisconsin Central $15,000
1889 H. P. Goldschmidt &
Co.
Wisconsin Central $21,000
1889 Jacob Stern Wisconsin Central $21,000
1889 Deutsche Bank Central Pacific $6,500,000
1890 Deutsche Bank Northern Pacific Consols $2,000,000
1890 Deutsche Bank Northern Pacific Consols $9,000,000
Total $65,323,000
Source: Buss (1978)
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in Germany would be joined, through the exchange of patents. Edison patents were in
use in Germany while Siemens and Halske patents would be used in United States. In
this way, the two communities of interest could be joined together in an international
market. Given the high cost of imports of steel and lead products in the United States,
Villard suggested that Siemens and Halske invest in the production of a US-based
plant to produce the cables. In April 1887 he was busy working out arrangements for
such a scheme. Villard intended for production of Siemens and Halske cables to be
undertaken by an Edison enterprise.
As Villard returned to Germany in 1888 to report these developments to
Siemens and Halske, a new strategy emerged, whereby the German interests would
seize control of the Edison interest in the U.S (Wilkins, 1989). Because Edison in
1889 was starved for liquidity, he was amenable to Villard’s suggestion that Edison
interests be consolidated under a new firm known as the Edison General Electric
company. Buss (1978) notes that $8.3 million out of the $12 million capitalization
of the new Edison General Electric firm represented investments from the German
interests (see Table 1). After the reorganization, Villard emerged as president of Edi-
son General Electric. Once in control, he brokered the ratification of the Siemens and
Halske cable factory contract (Buss, 1978)11.
11It is worth noting that pricing for the new cable factory was determined prior
to its construction. Buss notes (1978), the “market price of the lead cable was to
be set according to a formula developed in Germany.” The Edison interest in the
contract was authorized to issue any rebates it deemed necessary to build up the
market. Further, and not inconsequential from the standpoint of the German interests
maintaining and developing its own going concern prices, was the stipulation that
Siemens and Halske was guaranteed 20% of the profits and unfettered access to the
bookkeeping.
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Villard and the Central Station
Villard championed Edison’s central station concept (Buss, 1978; McGuire,
1986). In a letter to Siemens and Halske dated April 5, 1887, Villard described his
work promoting the central stations (Buss, 1978). Villard stated that his promotional
activities included the cities of New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Washington, Cleve-
land, Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Denver. Whereas domestic financiers were
reluctant to finance the development of the electric utility industry around the cen-
tral station concept, Villard and other German finance capitalists provided support
(Carosso, 1987; McGuire, Granovetter, and Schwartz 1993; Wilkins, 1989). Morgan
envisioned the development of the industry around the notion that electric products
would be sold as commodities, and that market boundaries would reflect proprietary
claims on the patents underwriting such technology. Electric manufacturing firms
would buy the right to lease the patents for defined terms, thereby generating a flow
of income that may then be capitalized.
Edison, Insull and Villard sought to market electricity itself as a commodity.
Centralized production and distribution of electricity through what would later be
known as the utility, offered a mechanism through which the new markets might be
governed. Like the railway empire Villard undertook in the PNW, the central station
would pursue an aggressive growth strategy, seeking to place itself at the center
of a large network of financial flows related to the provisioning of electricity. The
transmission and distribution grid, like the network of steel and wooden ties in the
case of the railroads, would fix in space the boundaries of the market. The business
enterprise engaged in electricity provisioning along the central station model would
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capitalize the load growth of cities within these boundaries. Further, through the use
of market governance institutions, the holding company in particular, it would connect
many urban systems into regional empires. To this end, the promise of business
enterprise exemplified in the central station concept was nearly indistinguishable from
that of the railroad corporations of the late 19th century.
The North American Company
The North American Company, one of the most important public utility hold-
ing companies in the 20th century, was a creature of Villard and evolved from his
earlier use of the holding company as a market governance institution in the PNW.
Recall, Villard had gained control of the transportation and navigation situation in
the PNW by leveraging his social network via the ‘Blind Pool’ (Hedges, 1930). How-
ever, to ensure ongoing control of both the Northern Pacific and his own ORNC he
incorporated the Oregon and Transcontinental Company in 1881. Students of market
governance will recall that corporations were generally not provided the legal right to
hold stocks in other corporations prior to 1888, however, this did not prevent Villard
and others from seeking special legislative favors to enable them to do so12. Villard
12The legitimacy for a concern to hold stocks in another company prior to 1888
was not explicitly provided for under the general incorporation acts in any state
(Bonbright and Means, 1932). The implicit right to hold stock in other corporations
was commonly referred to the courts. In 1888 New Jersey amended its general in-
corporation laws allowing explicitily for intercorporate stock holdings. Nevertheless,
many holding companies did exist prior to 1888, sanctioned by “special favors of a
legislature.” In 1868, the state of Pennsylvania granted the Continental Improvement
Company the “full power and authority to hold and own securities of any form, either
as collateral or otherwise, and to dispose of the same at pleasure” (Bonbright and
Means, 1932). Bonbright and Means (1932) cite forty-one further instances between
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did experiment with other forms of market governance, such as traffic pooling agree-
ments. However, traffic agreements are typically not an enduring form of market
governance (Bonbright and Means, 1932). Since Villard was determined to ensure
that Portland would be the terminus for the transcontinental railroad in the region
(Buss, 1978; Grodinsky, 1962; Hedges, 1930; Villard, 1904), he sought firmer control
over the Northern Pacific.
The holding company offered a mechanism through which control of very large
corporations could be established with a minimum stake in the subsidiary concerns.
Moreover, the Oregon and Transcontinental charter allowed for a rather broad scope
of market activity, to include production of the primary commodity groups that would
serve as a the basis of its freight traffic, such as agriculture, mining and lumbering. In-
1868 - 1872 in which holding companies were incorporated with identical favor as the
Continental Improvement Company, and in many cases with the same language, for
the same set of incorporators.
While Bonbright and Means (1932) focus their early history of holding companies
in Northeastern states, apparently these practices were common in Oregon as well.
Villard’s Oregon Improvement Company, which held stocks in mining concerns set up
to exploit the coal reserves in Western Washington, was named after the many “Im-
provement Companies” cited by Bonbright and Means (1932). The New York Times
referred directly to the Oregon and Transcontiental Company as a holding company.
A Times article dated June 16th, 1890, states, “[t]he Oregon and Transcontinental
Company, according to Poor’s Manual, was organized June 28th, 1881, under the
laws of the state of Oregon, for the general purpose of constructing railroads, to se-
cure harmony of action between the Oregon Railway and Navigation Company and
the Northern Pacific Railroad Company by a purchase of a controlling interest in the
stocks of these two companies and to furnish the means to build and equip branch
lines of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company (which that company cannot under
its charter construct) in order to increase the value of its land and its traffic by de-
velopment of the territory tributary to it, and to protect it from the encroachment of
rival lines” (“Under a new name”, 1890)
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deed, Villard’s Oregon Improvement Company was itself a holding company engaged
in these activities, and held by the Oregon and Transcontinental Company. However,
with the emergence of the electric utility, his holding company system would adjust
to conform with the pursuit of encapsulating this new technology under his corporate
control.
In 1890 the Oregon and Transcontinental Company was dissolved in Oregon
and reorganized as the North American Company for incorporation in New Jersey,
allowing for a broader scope of market activity permissible to the going concern. In
this example, it would be inappropriate to think of the two enterprises as distinct go-
ing concerns. The capital (in the Veblenian sense) embodied in the Transcontinental
was not diminished as a result of the new charter. The plant and equipment asso-
ciated with the underlying properties remained unchanged, and the going business
was still going. The only difference was that new markets became available to the
going concern as a result of the new charter, as well as new social relationships to be
capitalized. The purpose of the North American Company was to pursue the devel-
opment and proliferation of Edison’s central stations in the Midwest, where he was
well known among the German immigrant population, and thus carried the goodwill
for the concern (Buss, 1978).
Social Construction of the Electric Utility
There were two dominant technologies through which electricity might have
been provisioned: the isolated plant and the central station. Standard accounts ex-
plain the rise of the the central station as a response to the scale economies embodied
in the technology (Hughes, 1983; Wollner, 1990). However, upon closer inspection,
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the efficiencies resulting from scale are less certain and lend some doubt to the no-
tion that electricity must be provisioned by the central station. The issue lies in the
problem of energy usage patterns. It only takes one customer with a peak load well
above the median peak, to force the central station to carry reserves well in excess of
the normal capacity for most customers13. In the face of load uncertainty the central
station must retain excess capacity to meet peak demand. Thus, there is an obvi-
ous efficiency problem on the technological side. Isolated stations are more scalable,
because they are custom suited to the purposes for which they are installed. As a
result, each load center may minimize the proportion of plant that lies idle for the
sake of meeting peak demand.
There is also the matter of distribution. Central stations require the presence
and maintenance of large networks of transmission and distribution lines. The market
for central station power is limited to the extent of the transmission and distribution
grid. To pursue a growth strategy, as the empire builders that ultimately came to
dominate the industry during the period 1890 to 1925 did, implies that transmission
and distribution must be built ahead of demand. Further, the grid cannot be scaled
to match variations in load - once it has been built it must be maintained regardless
of revenues. From either a technical or economic standard of efficiency, the early
central station often failed the test. None of this is surprising if one leaves behind the
functional teleology that undergirds mainstream theories of the firm, which reduces
all agency to the single criterion of profit maximization.
During its formative years, the U.S. electricity industry was indeterminate with
13In the modern vernacular, these reserves are referred to as “firm resources.”
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respect to market boundaries, organizational forms, and technology (Granovetter and
McGuire, 1998). From 1880 through 1884, Edison sought to form distinct markets
for different aspects of the new, electric technologies. Edison, “drawing upon the
collective resources of himself and his associates and their families, and upon a pro-
duction monopoly secured by exclusive contracts, ... separated electric light current
business from the manufacture of electric devices, electric trolleys, electro-plating,
[and] telephone,” all of which preceded his incandescent system (Granovetter and
McGuire, 1998). By establishing boundaries between industries and markets, Edison
sought to control its development and direct it in such a way that favored his own
personal claims to the social technology. In particular, Edison wished to connect the
electric generating business with the incandescent lighting business, thereby pushing
manufacturers of arc lights out of the market. However, Edison was only one of many
persons involved in the development of the electricity industries. Some of those per-
sons that occupied important spaces in Edison’s network held interest to a broader
set of claims than Edison, and so influenced Edison to consider a broader market
definition than his more narrow conception (Granovetter and McGuire, 1998).
Most load was served by isolated systems rather than urban, central stations
through 1918 (Granovetter and McGuire, 1998). More than half of all electricity
produced in the U.S. was done so by industrial users, who sold excess capacity to
neighborhood distribution systems. However, despite these early leads in the de-
velopment of the industry, and despite the advantage of lower fixed costs, isolated
systems would ultimately be displaced by the central station. The key to understand-
ing how the industry would ultimately unfold lies in understanding how “identifiable
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social networks” worked to shape the selection of one system of provisioning over an-
other. Two trade associations, the National Electric Light Association (NELA) and
the Association of Edison Illuminating Companies (AEIC), would become central to
understanding how the central station came to dominate the business.
NELA was formed in 1885 to represent the interests of non-Edison concerns
engaged in selling electric current or in the manufacture of electric equipment (Gra-
novetter and McGuire, 1998). By 1888 NELA was dominated by influential persons
in the Electric Club, which constituted a network in which Edison was not central
(Granovetter and McGuire, 1998). The Electric Club, as David Nye notes (1990),
was comprised mostly of New Yorkers and those in northern New Jersey, most of
whom were executives of manufacturing firms, such as Thomson - Houston, heads of
utilities, or financiers. With NELA under the dominance of the Electric Club the
social network centered on what Granovetter and McGuire (1998) refer to as the “In-
sull / Edison group,” stood to lose influence and control over the development of the
new electric markets. As a result, Insull formed the AEIC to organize the “mostly
personal friends of Edison or Insull who were also executives of small Edison central
station incandescent lighting systems” (Granovetter and McGuire, 1998).
The Insull Group and the Institutionalization of the Central Station
Recall, German electrical interests, through Villard, sought to institute an in-
ternational cartel in the industry which it would then control (Wilkins, 1989). How-
ever, Villard’s attempt in 1892 to merge Edison General Electric with Thomson -
Houston for the purpose of consolidating further control failed, as Morgan “ turned
the tables” on him. Buss (1978) suggests Villard had considered merging the Edison
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and Thomson - Houston companies in 1888, but “was prevented from carrying out
his plans because of Edison’s objections.” However, with the German finance-led in-
corporation of Edison General Electric in 1890, “Edison’s influence in the firm had
been greatly reduced, and Villard then felt free to consider the merger.” Functionalist
explanations (Hughes, 1983; Wollner, 1990) of the emergence of the electric indus-
tries rely upon a cost-minimizing story, such that the merger between Edison General
Electric and Thomson - Houston was inevitable given the complementarity between
their two sets of patents. However, history shows that corporate control was the main
driving force behind this consolidation.
With the formation of General Electric (GE) in 1892, Samuel Insull, who had
been Edison’s secretary and was personally vested in Edison interests, exited the
going concern14. In short order Insull, with a tightly woven network of associates,
would lead the social construction of the electricity industry around the develop-
ment of the central station. According to Granovetter and McGuire (1998) (see also
McGuire, Granovetter, and Schwartz, 1993) the “Insull circle” pursued a growth
dynamic strategy, wherein central stations would “scrap and replace old technology
14A number of reasons explain why Insull left General Electric. First, Insull would
not work for Charles Coffin, president of the newly formed General Electric Company,
whom he felt unfit for the job. According to McDonald (1962), Insull was “convinced
that Coffin did not understand the business and that he himself should have had
the presidency.” Second, Insull felt that profiting from the merger would be a breach
of good conduct, as the Edison interests, with whom he was aligned, harbored “ill
feelings” over the fact that they lost control over the business enterprise they built.
Third, and most significant, Insull and the “Edisonians,” sought development of the
market for electricity around the concept of the central station, rather than equipment
manufacture and sale, as Coffin had pursued with Thomson - Houston (Insull, 1992;
McDonald, 1962)
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with new, create and expand a territorial monopoly, increase total and per capita load
and establish load balance,” for the purpose of institutionalizing the central station.
The earliest members of the Insull circle included Samuel Insull, John Lieb, Charles
Edgar, and Louis Ferguson, all of whom worked in Edison’s Goerck Street plant in
the early 1880s. William Barstow, an Edison engineer, joined Lieb, Edgar and Insull
on the board of the Electrical Testing Laboratory, a certifying board established in
order to check GE’s dominance in the industry. The Insull circle, including Barstow,
would remain most central in the AEIC through 1910 (see Chung, 1997 for a network
analysis), and would dominate the NELA until the collapse of the holding company
system of governance in the 1930s.
In 1897 the Insull circle, allied with a broader set of AEIC central stations, es-
tablished a coherent and significant faction in the NELA. From 1901 to 1910, members
of the Insull faction occupied seats in two-thirds of NELA committees, which served
to align the behavior of member stations with the trade association (Granovetter and
McGuire, 1998). By leveraging the social network, the Insull circle was able to direct
the NELA through “ strategic influence...rather than overt domination” (Granovetter
and McGuire, 1998).
Displacing isolated generation systems became a central objective of the NELA
after Insull’s de facto takeover. Many isolated systems were co-generation systems,
supplying both electric current and steam for direct heating. Rather than expend
energy to cool generators, co-gen systems sold the waste heat directly to households
as commidified steam. Such isolated systems were incredibly efficient. Citing Henry
Doherty, a prominent utility executive of the day, Granovetter and McGuire (1998)
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point out that in order to gain market share for the central station, “ investor-owned
utilities ... often build otherwise unneeded steam plants to meet the full need of the
customer, and ran them at a loss, just to eliminate the competition for electricity.”
Such examples of diseconomies cast serious doubt on the conventional story that
central stations were more efficient, or that profit maximization served as the sole
criterion of the business enterprise.
Insull used his control over the trade associations, especially the NELA, to
lobby for regulation by state commissions (McDonald, 1958). Insull’s call for public
regulation of the utility business was resisted initially15. However, as Insull argued,
and the NELA came to embrace, state regulation of public utilities was sound busi-
15Insull’s views were not shared widely among his contemporaries in the infant
electric utility business (Insull, 1992; McDonald, 1958, 1962). McDonald (1958) ar-
gues that Insull’s attitude toward public utility regulation was “distinctly European.”
Insull himself was British, but McDonald points to Villard for influencing his views
on the “natural monopoly” question. When compared to the American experience in
big business, Germans had a much more amicable view toward cartels, and market
governance in general.
Compared to American business in general, however, Insull views concerning mar-
ket governance were not so deviant. From 1877 onward railroad men sought and won
regulation of their own industry for purposes of market governance (Kolko, 1965). By
proactively shaping the course of public control over their industry railroad leaders
hoped to stave off more radical attacks on their right to make prime and sole claim
on the surplus. In 1884 Charles Francis Adams, Jr., then director for the Union Pa-
cific, was working with Massachusetts representative John D. Long, member of the
House Committee on Commerce, to craft favorable regulatory legislation. In a letter
to Adams, Long sought clarification on the intent of the bill, “[w]hat is desired, if I
understand it ... is something having a good sound, but quite harmless, which will
impress the popular mind with the idea that a great deal is being done, when, in
reality, very little is intended to be done.” In this light, Insull’s movement for state
commissions governing the market for electricity provisioning simply reflected earlier
efforts in the railroad industry.
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ness. Regulation would promote the development of the central station in two ways:
First, it narrowed the field of provisioning to central stations. For instance, the Mas-
sachusetts Gas and Electric Commission banned isolated stations from selling surplus
current or heat across streets or through alleys, because they were not regulated
utilities (Granovetter and McGuire, 1998). Given that regulatory commissions were
instituted on the presumption that natural monopolies existed and were affected with
the public interest, it follows that such commissions may only regulate natural mo-
nopolies. Second, it provided a method of market governance, whereby going concern
prices could be established and maintained. Vested with the authority to define the
scale and scope of the electric utility, regulatory commissions presented the oppor-
tunity for a legally sanctioned restrictive trade practice, favoring the central station.
To this end, Samuel Insull, “instead of denouncing the activities of the populists,
socialists, anarchists, and other nascent progressives,” proposed in his presidential
address of 1898:
... that the electric utility industry seek to have itself regulated by
governmental bodies, clothed with the full power to fix rates and stan-
dards of service, and seek to alter the conditions of franchises so that
if a company failed to render satisfactory service, the municipality it
served would have the right to acquire its plant at cost less depreci-
ation. Furthermore, Insull asserted that the ultimate interests of the
industry itself required such restrictions, and he urged that it actively
lobby for legislation to bring them about (McDonald, 1958)
The Central Station and the Wright System of Rates
The method of pricing electricity was instrumental in shaping the develop-
ment of the industry. In the mid 1890’s the electricity industry, through the trade
associations, fought to settle the question of which of two rates systems would be-
63
come institutionalized: The Barstow or Wright system (Yakubovich, Granovetter,
and McGuire, 2005).
William Barstow, an engineer with Brooklyn Edison, proposed a time-of-day
pricing system. The load shape for a given utility (or isolated system that sells its
surplus power) will reflect the ebb and flows of consumer demand. A typical day will
have a load shape that may divided into peak and off-peak hours. Barstow proposed
charging higher prices during peak hours, while discounting off-peak hours, with the
hope that doing so would allow for a utility to smooth its load shape. A more even
balance between peak and off-peak demand translates into higher load factors16 for
the utility, allowing it to carry less reserves (Yakubovich, Granovetter, and McGuire,
2005).
The Wright System, on the other hand, was a uniform rate. The rate was
designed to recover the individual customer’s pro-rata fixed costs according to peak
demand, as well as charges for actual energy used during the billing period. While
the rate varied by customer based upon demand, it was uniform across all hours of
the day and no rebates were allowed.
Insull and his allies dominated both trade associations, the AEIC and NELA,
which were the only forums in which issues such as rate setting could be worked out
coherently. Because the Insull group sought to institutionalize the central station
as the vehicle through which electricity would be provisioned, their desire to build
16For a given utility the load factor is calculated as follows: L = C
(MT )
, where L
is load factor, C is the total amount of electricity generated at a given point in time,
M is peak demand, and T is an interval of time (usually an hour). (Yakubovich,
Granovetter, and McGuire, 2005).
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empires of markets would structure their choice of rate systems. That is, Insull et
al., would choose that rate system most conducive to growth. Early industry leaders
found that perceptions of fairness mattered in building their market, and so moved to
implement a uniform system that did not offer special rebates on an individual basis.
The question of fairness as it bears on the process of building a market for central
station electrity is captured by one manager:
In a small town ... we cannot make special contracts. In the city
you can make special contracts on the same principle that you can
live next door neighbor to a man and not know him, whereas in a
small town like ours we must have some basis of charge for current
that is uniform to all customers. If we make a rate with a customer
on a street, within twenty four hours every customer on that street
will know about it, notwithstanding the customer might have made
very positive promises that he would keep the price to himself. He
won’t do it. If he thinks he is buying current a little bit cheaper than
someone else, he can’t keep from telling it. In the city that probably
is different (Yakubovich, Granovetter, and McGuire, 2005).
Thus, Wright’s uniform system of rates was adopted by the industry in 1898
for its conduciveness to market growth for the central station. From the standpoint
of cost minimization, Barstow’s rate was more efficient. However, AEIC and NELA
meeting minutes reveal that early managers of central stations were not primarily
concerned with cost minimization, but rather bringing as many customers as possible
within the purview of their markets (Yakubovich, Granovetter, and McGuire, 2005)17.
17Ironically, modern utilities have revisited the problem of using rates to shape
peak demand. In the industry, this method of pricing is known as Demand Response
Management. This may be explained by the fact that modern communities have come
to rely upon electricity to carry out the economic life process. Electricity has been
institutionalized. Customers, whether residential, commercial, or industrial, typically
do not have the choice of not consuming electricity, so uniform rates no longer matter
the way they did in the 1890s.
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Electrifying the Northwest
Histories of electricity in the region often begin by recounting its first demon-
stration in Portland, Oregon. This “Brilliant Spectacle” (Hirt, 2012) was thought
to be the moment at which consumers would demand electricity and thereby pass
into modernity (Nye, 1990). It is easy to read into this history an inexorable drive
toward electrification. Indeed, the possibilities for a clean and bright future seemed
within reach (Nye, 1990), prompting a progressive, utopian response18. Yet, the new
technology was always under the control of interests vested in the reproduction of
a pecuniary, proprietary society, so that whatever technological marvel electricity
promised the actual application would be limited in scope. Only those applications
that generate a profit and do not undermine the pecuniary viability of the economic
system as a whole, will be undertaken. The manner in which the social construction
process occurs reflects the centrality of those persons embedded in the relevant net-
works. For our purposes it will be of interest to show how the development of the
industry in the PNW was connected to the legacy of Henry Villard and the railroads
he commanded.
Because the electricity industries are governed by business enterprise this anal-
ysis begins earlier than Villard’s symbolic, techno-spectacle, opting instead to trace its
emergence to the corporate roots that precede it. The political economy conjuncture
18Nye (1990) points to a number of utopian novels, including Edward Bellamy’s
later work, in which electricity would ameliorate most social ills. One prediction sug-
gested that electricity could be used to prevent divorce, by allowing for the production
of “ Electric Equalizers” that automatically “dissipate any domestic storm and insure
harmony in families.”
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resulting from private control of the region’s watershed, provided the germ for the
emergence of a new resource: hydroelectric power. While placing rivers into service
as sources of power for the machine process is not unique to the PNW, with Lowell,
Massachusetts as the most obvious example in U.S. economic history19, its modern
practice reflects the region’s peculiar, institutional development. In particular, the
struggle over control of the river for the sake of a going navigation business produced
the conditions under which the Willamette Falls at Oregon City would become a
site of economic importance. The growth and development of Portland’s first central
station began with the development of hydroelectric power at the Willamette Falls,
therefore a brief examination of the economic processes that transformed that space
into a resource is warranted.
During the period 1860 - 1880 the Oregon Steam Navigation Company enjoyed
monopoly over river traffic into the Inland Empire20, along the Columbia River and
upper Willamette River (Johansen, 1941). Demand for navigation services was driven
primarily by Idaho’s gold rush in the early 1860’s (Scott, 1917). Goods and persons
were transported by the OSN to Wallula (the landing at present day Walla Walla,
19The immigration pamphlets published by corporations such as the Oregon Rail-
way and Navigation Company and Oregon Improvement Company, as well as the city
of Portland, described the region as possessing the water power potential of Lowell,
MA. The verity of these claims was irrelevant; immigrants from the East understood
what Lowell had achieved by placing its waterways into industrial service. Aside from
the occasional mill, the rivers of the Columbia basin remained largely ungoverned un-
til the reclamation projects of the New Deal era. (Oregon Immigration Board, 1888;
Oregon Improvement Company, 1881; Oregon Railway & Navigation Company, 1880)
20Recall, the Inland Empire refers to the upper portion of the Columbia River
basin, defined chiefly by the Snake River basin.
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WA) along the Columbia, then transported by mule train to the various mining
districts (Johansen, 1941; Johansen and Gates, 1967). At first the region was wholly
dependent upon imports, but by the mid 1870’s the production of wheat in the
Inland Empire formed the basis of an export business, which the steamers of the OSN
carried. Charging “all the traffic can bear,” the OSN generated sufficient revenues to
further consolidate ownership of the portages and docks, maintain its growing fleet,
and enriching its owners. Poppleton (1908) provides a glimpse of its rate structure
effective April 1, 1877 (Table 2):
Table 2. Freight rate per ton.
Leg Distance Rate / ton
Portland - The Dalles 121 miles $10.00
Portland - Umatilla 217 miles $20.00
Portland - Wallula 240 miles $25.00
Portland - Palouse 317 miles $32.00
Portland -
Penewawa and Almota
348 miles $37.50
Portland - Lewiston 401 miles $40.00
Fast freight
Portland - The Dalles $2.50 per
ton extra
Portland - all points
above The Dalles
$5.00 per ton extra
Source: Poppleton (1908)
Compared to similar navigation concerns operating in the Midwest and Great
Lakes areas, OSN rates were unusually high. On average, the OSN’s rate per ton
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was ten times that which prevailed on the Missouri, a notoriously dangerous river to
navigate in the pre-dam era (Poppleton, 1908). Whereas the OSN charged $40 per
ton to move freight from Portland to Lewiston, a distance of 401 miles, the same ton
would travel 3,200 miles from St. Louis, MO to Ft. Benton, MT.
Differences in convention help explain part of the regional divergence in rates.
The OSN maintained the convention among Columbia River steamboat captains to
specify tonnage by cubic volume: the maximum reach of any part of the freight was
used to define a three-dimension envelope in which the freight could be housed. For
example, an ox cart would be measured so that the length include the tongue fully
extended, its height with the tongue lifted vertically, and width calculated from wheel
to wheel. The rule of thumb then yielded one ton for each cubic feet of this notional
envelope. Under no circumstances would volume be deducted for empty space within
the envelope. According to Poppleton (1908), this method resulted in overestimates
of weight by as much 300% when compared to practices in the East.
The geology of the Columbia River basin also explain part of the cost of
navigation. At various points along the Columbia, the river falls through cascading
falls, which prior to the construction of a lock and canal system, required portage
to make passage. Portage involves transferring cargo to wagon teams, and later
railroads, below the falls then transporting it above the falls, where it is loaded on a
new ship that continues until it encounters another obstacle. While Poppleton (1908)
reflects the popular view that prevailed in 1860s and 1870s that the OSN’s rates were
almost all profit, Johansen (1941) points to the high cost of portage as evidence that
profit rates were probably lower than people imagined. Nevertheless, the OSN’s rates
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were going concern prices: the mark up was sufficient to reproduce the concern and
generate a flow of income to its shareholders, sometimes as high as 37% (Johansen,
1962), but usually around 12% (Poppleton, 1908).
Owing to the high cost of portage at the Willamette Falls (Oregon City) two
concerns endeavored to build lock and canal systems. In 1868 the People’s Transporta-
tion Company built a crude, wooden system on the east side of the river. In the same
year, a legislative act provided for a state-subsidized corporation, the Willamette
Falls Canal and Locks Company, with the hope that prices might be regulated by
competition (Robley, 1935; Stewart, 1950). Large debts incurred in the construction
of its canal, as well as the threat of a protracted rate war between rival steam and
rail concerns, resulted in the sale of the People’s Transportation Company to Ben
Holladay in 1871 (Villard, 1944; Wright, 1875). It was Holladay’s intention to con-
trol the railways in Oregon since his arrival in 1868. Maintaining the viability of
the Oregon and California, which he had incorporated with the hopes of renewing
the goodwill embodied in his legal claim to the Oregon Central land grant, required
control over the navigation business on the Willamette. However, by 1870 public
opinion had soured against Holladay and the Granger controlled legislature passed
a bill that provided for further subsidies to the Willamette Falls Canal and Locks
Company, with the hope of dislodging his control (H.R. Doc No. 202, 1899 Villard,
1944). It is important to emphasize that the Grangers in Oregon viewed monopoly
control over steamships, docks, and silos as the source of their disadvantages, holding
to the belief that market forces at the Liverpool grain exchange would yield them a
fair price (Buck, 1913; Carr, 1875).
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The legal device that gave birth to the Willamette Falls Canal and Locks
Company also spurred the creation of two concerns that would further threaten Hol-
laday’s control: Willamette River Transportation Company and the Farmers’ Dock
and Warehouse Company. Holladay promptly lowered rates in an effort to expel the
contestants from the market, driving the price below a sustainable level for the new
concerns. The OSN joined Holladay on the Lower Columbia21 (Villard, 1944).
In 1874 a compromise was struck between Holladay and Barney Goldsmith,
who controlled the opposing enterprises and acted as agent for the Willamette Falls
Canal and Locks Company, so that all going concerns engaged in the Willamette navi-
gation business were to operate under a unified management, while the locks company
would adopt the railroad freight rates. Further, a system of subsidies between the
concerns would be established to level respective differences in cost.
However, the market governance agreement between Holladay and Goldsmith
was foiled as the OSN held that its pursuance would breach its previous agreement
in 1863 with the People’s Transportation Company, which divided the market (Jo-
hansen, 1941; Villard, 1944). Per the agreement, the People’s Transportation Com-
pany would leave the Lower Columbia market to the OSN, and vice versa regarding
the Willamette. While Holladay purchased the former concern in 1871, its going
business remained intact. In this case the going business was structured by the mar-
ket division agreement with the OSN; should the agreement breakdown, the web of
financial relations that constitute the going business would begin to unravel.
21The Lower Columbia constites the stretch from the confluence of the Willamette
and Columbia to its mouth at the Pacific Ocean.
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In addition, state fiscal support to the Willamette Falls Canal and Lock Com-
pany was insufficient to overcome the reduncancy of two competing canal concerns
relative to the size of the market, and so it would be absorbed by the larger, more
solvent OSN. Holladay’s navigation concerns, which by 1872 included the Oregon
Steamship Company, would pass into Villard’s control in 1876 while working in the
interests of the Frankfort bondholders. In 1879, Villard organized the ORNC, allow-
ing him to secure control of all railway and navigation concerns in the region, while
freeing him from the Frankfort bondholders22. The outcome was absolute control of
the Willamette Falls, which enabled him to initiate a process that would recreate the
site as an electric resource.
In 1884 Henry Villard, after he was ousted from the ORNC and the Northern
Pacific, but remaining in control of the Willamette Falls, commissioned a full survey
of its water power potential. In doing so, Villard sought to apply Edison’s technology
controlled by the Edison Electric Light Company to the property at the falls, which
had become a resource as a result of cumulative development of the institutional
fabric. That is, a river does not naturally yield power as a resource. To produce a
resource requires a nexus of social and spatial relations so organized that a proprietary
relation may be conferred upon it, in conjunction with the application of a specific
technology (De Gregori, 1987).
On November 8th, 1888, Morey and Eastham, members of Portland’s business
elite, incorporated the Willamette Falls Electric Company. According to Wollner
(1990), Easton had formulated a plan to buy the Willamette Transportation Locks
22See Green (2014a) for a detailed discussion of this reorganization.
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Company23 as early as 1883, due to its monopoly on the falls. In 1887 he had
purchased the rights sufficient to grant him effective control over the Willamette
Falls. Because the engineer’s report to Villard had so thoroughly documented the
enormous potential of waterpower at the falls, Morey and Eastham were able to
draw upon such accretion to the joint stock of knowledge24. On June 3rd, 1889,
Willamette Falls Electric Company demonstrated the first long-distance transmission
of electricity from Oregon City to Portland using alternating current generation.
The Willamette Falls Electric Company was reorganized as Portland General
Electric in 1891. The new concern was capitalized at $4.25 million, most of which
flowed from the Old Colony Trust Company of Boston. The General Electric Com-
pany of Boston was also a major investor and Portland General Electric (PGE), in
order to establish ties between Portland and the Boston firms so that the former
would purchase parts from the latter. The Old Colony Trust Company, according to
MacColl (1979), served as Boston’s “old guard” financial institution25.
23This was the concern that Holladay had incorporated to consolidate his navigation
holdings after his purchase of the People’s Transportation Company. However, its
subsidiaries as distinct going concerns remained intact, evidenced by Villard’s direct
reference to the Oregon Steamship Company as the navigation company he came to
acquire and control in 1876 (Villard, 1944).
24Other stockholders in Willamette Falls Electric Company included David P
Thompson, R. H Thompson, Lester Leander Hawkins and William K Smith.
25MacColl claims Boston as the center of high finance during the age in which the
railroads, as well as the first great trusts in mining, textiles, and utilities. This claim
is too ambitious: the financial center for these concerns encompassed network that
spanned Boston, New York, and Philadelphia in the U.S., as well as London, Berlin
and Frankfort in Germany (White 2011; Wilkins 1989)
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The organization of PGE provides evidence in support of the claim that elec-
tric utilities found roots in in the railroad - finance nexus. Frederick Ames, a director
for the Old Colony, was also a director at American Loan and Trust Co., as well as
a number of important railroads (see Figure 3, see Figure 5 for the Boston finan-
cial network in which Ames was embedded). Henry Reed, secretary of the Lewis &
Clark Centennial Exposition26, reported on July 7th 1904 that PGE had won the
contract to suppy the Exposition with electric current, valued at $82,000. Wollner
(1990) dismisses the interconnections between PGE executives27, financiers, and the
governance of the Exposition as superficial to the ongoing development of the going
concern. However, Wollner’s analysis is teleological, and the men of electricity and
finance in his corporate history of PGE are seen as heros, undertakers of a progressive
26World fairs and expositions were a popular way to promote electrification. They
also provided a platform from which to perpetuate the ideology of imperialism. The
“Great White Way” in Chicago’s World Fair possessed double meaning: cities were
white with illumination, with central boulevards emblazoned with electric light, but
the exhibitions were structured so that the brightest, and most central displays, were
those of recent Western settlement and achievement in American history. Again, the
Anglo-Saxon, Christian American was held up as the pinnacle of human achievement,
whereas other cultures, both extant and extinct, were displayed so that they dimmed
as they grew more distal to the center. Native American and African traditions were
not illuminated at all and occupied the very edges of the expositions (Hirt, 2012; Nye,
1990).
27At the time, Henry Goode was both president of the Exposition’s planning and
governance board as well as Portland General Electric. Goode originated from the
Northwest Thomson - Houston Company, which was strongly tied to Eastern fi-
nanciers through Charles Coffin. James R. Thompson of Portland General Electric
was also the fair’s electrical engineer (Wollner 1990). For a detailed account of the
financial connections of the Northwest Thomson - Houston Company, regional sub-
sidiary of the firm that would be merged with Edison General Electric to form General
Electric, see the July 24th, 1895 issue of Electricity, a weekly publication.
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and inevitable technology. While PGE retained local control initially, when it was in-
corporated into the Portland Railway, Light and Power Company (PRLP) 1906, such
control passed to the hands of Eastern capital. The controlling interest in PRLP lied
in the hands of the Clark family of Philadelphia. (MacColl, 1979). MacColl states
that the formation of the PRLP was “Portland’s first bona fide monopoly,” however,
such a claim is untenable given the Oregon Steam Navigation Company had consol-
idated total control over river traffic as early as 1862 (Poppleton, 1908)28. Figure 4
offers a summary of the consolidation of Portland’s electric utilities between 1884 -
1906.
Political and economic consolidation
Men alone do not make their history. Rather, it is collective action that
moves the wheel of time. Social networks, when controlled by a subset of persons
and directed toward a common purpose, generate institutional capacity. To sustain
the power of the emerging electric utility in Portland, Oregon, it became necessary
to pursue consolidation of political power. Given that the underlying value of the
utilities examined here rests upon the acquisition of city franchises to rights-of-way, in
other words, goodwill capital, the owners and managers of these corporations sought
to consolidate city government. The consolidated city government would facilitate
the procurement of franchises making it easier to maintain legal claim to the capital
it embodies. In 1891 the Oregon state legislature authorized the consolidation of
28In fact, it was the Oregon Steam Navigation Company that provided much of the
capitalized value for the later incorporated Oregon Railway Navigation Company,
which, in turn, provided the same for the Oregon and Transcontinental.
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Figure 4. Electric Utility Mergers in Portland, OR: 1884 - 1906
Source: MacColl (1976)
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Figure 5. Frederick Ames and Boston finance c. 1891.
Network constructed as union of two sets: the ego networks Old Colony Trust Co.
and American Loan and Trust Co., taken at two degrees of separation. Network
constructed from data courtesy of Mark Granovetter. The database of bank - di-
rector relations was part of a larger project involving Mark Granovetter and Patrick
McGuire as principle investigators during the 1990s. McGuire was Granovetters doc-
toral student at SUNY - Stony Brook, whose dissertation traces corporate control in
electric power markets from inception through its chief market governance institution
(1986), the National Electric Light Association (NELA).
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East Portland, West Portland (presently the central business district), Albina and
St. John’s (Hirt, 2012). As Hirt suggests,
[m]any vested interests contributed to this political merger. Members
of the state legislature who spearheaded the consolidation effort in-
cluded Oregon Railway Navigation attorney Joseph Simon, who was
the Oregon State Senate president that year; Attorney P. L. Willis,
who was Swigert’s partner in the Electric Land Company and the
state senator for the district that included St. John [sic] and Albina;
P. F. Morey, who was the president of Willamette Falls Electric Com-
pany and had just won a seat in the Senate legislature in order to
promote city consolidation (2011).
The current, albeit peculiar, layout of the city today serves as a legacy of the
power of these early patriarchs to recreate spatial relations in the pursuit of their
private ends. Portland’s many and charming neighborhoods grew haphazardly from
the streetcar lines the utility men extended to further load growth, and engage in real
estate speculation (MacColl, 1976). Neighborhoods like Hawthorne and Belmont on
the Eastside, Alberta and Albina / Missippippi on North Portland, and “Northwest,”
are hailed as models for mixed-use real estate development today, while hosting an
orgy of conspicuous consumption. Yet, they were not conceived as such by those who
built them, with the aid of the public trust, who intended to carve out pecuniary
fiefdoms in an electric empire on the Columbia.
Conclusion
This essay has traced the roots of the electric utility to the railroads in the
Pacific Northwest. Emphasizing its beginnings in Portland, OR, highlights its com-
mon foundation with the navigation and railroad business that grew up in post Civil
War period. In the region, hydroelectric power has always defined the provisioning
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of electricity, with the modern experience of the Columbia completely mediated by
the concrete and steel machines that have tamed it. By tracing its history to its cor-
porate roots, it was shown how the emergence of water power as an electric resource
developed from the conflict between warring factions of the business elite. Propri-
etary claim to the Willamette Falls emerged as a direct result over the struggle for
control of the navigation business. Once that geological legacy was recast as property
it passed through a chain of control that quickly settled into Villard’s hands, who
initated the process that would ultimately reproduce the site as an electric resource.
Therefore, the dawn of the electric age begins prior to the region’s introduction to
the spectacle of electric light.
This claim may be sustained because the actual development of electric tech-
nologies unfolded in a context in which business enterprise governs the social provi-
sioning process. While some histories suggest its revolutionary inevitability, a more
critical view finds that development of new technologies and market governance are
two sides of the same coin. Vested interests condition the integration of new social
technologies in such a way that allows for ongoing privilege to make claims to the
surplus deriving from them. Consequently, it is reasonable to examine the business
processes that lead up to the development of a new technology.
This essay has strived to connect developments in the Pacific Northwest to
global processes. The relationship between Villard and Edison was chosen as an im-
portant entry point, because it underscores the overarching methodological premise in
the dissertation: the fundamental unit of analysis when examining cumulative change
is the social relationship. Specifically, we are interested in those relationships that
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matter most in explaining how the social provisioning process undergoes wholesale,
qualitative change in reference to its regional watershed. Villard was related directly,
and indirectly, to the Columia River basin, through his ownership and control of the
great industries that were constituted by it. As a financier, Villard was instrumen-
tal in developing Edison’s technologies in New York and New Jersey, which had the
effect of establishing a set of technical and social ties between the Pacific Northwest
and the Edison Electric Light Company. As an empire builder, Villard set to embed
these ties in an international cartel based in Germany, in which he and his fellow
financiers would exert control. Because Villard was granted the authority to act in
an institutional capacity as a result of his proprietary and social relationships in the
Pacific Northwest, he would form one side of many relationships that would condition
the cumulative development of the region going forward. Relationships of a business
nature would work to recreate the region as an electric empire on the Columbia.
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CHAPTER 4
THIS DAM MACHINE KILLS FASCISTS
Just watch this river and pretty soon
Ever’body’s goin’ to be changin’ their tune.
The big Grand Coulee and Bonneville Dam
Run a thousand factories for Uncle Sam.
Woody Guthrie, Talking Columbia
Introduction
By the time the United States was fully engaged in World War II the Columbia
River had been transformed into a machine placed in the service of generating elec-
tric power. The Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) emerged as the institution
responsible for governing this machine. Today, the BPA remains the central institu-
tion through which the regional economy is coordinated: any industry in the region
that takes electricity, fish, irrigated water, and navigable channels as an input relies
directly or indirectly upon the BPA, an institution of the state that manages the
complex of federal and non-federal hydroelectric dams within the Columbia River
watershed1. The very notion of the Pacific Northwest as a coherent region emerges
as an artifact of the development of the BPA.
This essay situates the Pacific Northwest, as a coherent region, within the
1Today there are thirty-one federally owned and operated dams on the Columbia
and its tributaries. Bonneville and Grand Coulee, both constructed during the New
Deal, were the flagships projects for the BPA at its inception. While BPA manages the
Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS), the individual projects are owned
by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers or the Bureau of Reclamation. In addition,
there are four non-federal dams on the middle Columbia, that must be coordinated
as part of the whole the system.
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broader national movement towards public power. The Pacific Northwest emerged
as an important aspect of this broader movement, because of the confluence of its
potential for hydroelectric resources and the political and economic conjuncture over
control of electric power. Consequently, the waterways of the Pacific Northwest oc-
cupy a central place within this movement, anchoring cumulative development of the
regional economy in direct reference to the watersheds.
I have argued elsewhere (Green 2014a, 2014b) that certain social relationships,
given their centrality within the social networks that govern the provisioning process,
had the effect of transforming the region into a site of capitalist development. Collec-
tive action tied the region to global markets through an intricate web of financial and
material relations. Issuing liabilities to German bondholders, for instance, presumably
for the construction of a coherent, regional transportation network connected what
was otherwise a loose colonial appendage firmly to the world system of capitalism.
But, because these ties were so enduring, new going concerns emerged that sought to
reproduce their own conditions of existence by nurturing the development of markets.
From the market for navigation and railway transportation to the market for electric
power, common sets of financiers and businessmen alike created a set of conditions
that would bring the Northwest into the broader field of the corporate economy. An
important aspect of this integration was through the public utility holding company.
The Power Trust: exercise of corporate power in the public utility field
Two approaches emerged in the 1920s that sought to rationalize and increase
the efficiency of the electric utility industry. Super Power embodied the belief that pri-
vate industry through, voluntary association, could rationalize the industry through
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interconnection. Giant Power, on the other hand, was driven by the Progressive belief
that a combination of scientific management and strong federal regulation, would not
only make the industry more rational, but allow for the extension of the market into
rural areas (DeGraaf, 1990). Moreover, Giant Power embodied the idea that electric-
ity should be provisioned at a “postage stamp” rate; the rate for electricity should
be cheap and even, irrespective of the pecuniary cost of its provision. Each approach
shared the principles of “corporate liberalism,” which DeGraaf (1990) describes as “an
emerging public policymaking sector... [that] created quasi-public agencies to solve
economic problems that traditional political and corporate institutions were either
unwilling or unable to approach by themselves.” However DeGraaf (1990) rejects the
notion that networks of influential persons seeking to rationalize public planning were
homogeneous in the extent to which their actions were described by the principles of
corporate liberalism.
Initially the private utilities supported Super Power, especially in the wake
of World War I when demand for power threatened to exhaust capacity for indi-
vidual utilities (DeGraaf, 1990; Funigiello, 1973). The project of creating a Super
Power entity that would coordinate grid interconnectedness and shared capacity re-
sources2, while remaining within the purview of private governance was attractive.
2Generation and capacity are distinct concepts in the electric utility business.
Generation is a flow concept, concerning the rate at which watts of electricity may
be provisioned. Capacity concerns the ability for a system to “ramp-up” or “ramp-
down” generating reserves, however, this is not directly analogous to a stock concept.
Once the energy embodied in the fuel source for a given generator is converted to
electricity, flows do not accumulate to stocks of electricity, unless storage technologies
are employed. Electricity may only be stored in batteries or capacitors. Electricity
may be converted to other forms of potential energy, but the technologies that enable
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William S. Murray, industry engineer, embarked upon his Super Power Survey that
attempted “to use engineering principles to solve the utility industry’s supply prob-
lem” (DeGraaf, 1990). Murray enjoyed the support of private industry and the federal
government. Super Power’s advisory board included members of the managerial class
that governed both business enterprise in utilities and railroads, as well as engineers.
Most notable was Herbert Hoover, a classic example of the corporate liberal planner.
Matthew S. Sloan, president of Brooklyn Edison, also served in an advisory role. Sloan
would be instrumental in NELA’s propaganda campaign of the 1920s that sought to
conceal the rapacity of the private utilities behind the veil of laissez-faire3.
To develop the institutional capacity to govern physical operation of the myr-
iad local utilities that would comprise Super Power, the advisory board sought to
vest the varied interests into a common Super Power Corporation. A subcommittee
was established to draft the corporate charter. Matthew Sloan, Edward Buckland,
and William Barstow comprised the subcommittee. The subcommittee recommended
the Corporation be chartered by the federal government and subject itself to regula-
tion, so that it may engage in interstate commerce with regard to the transmission
of electricity. Members of the subcommittee recognized that unless it was subject
to federal regulation the Super Power Corporation would become the target of the
such storage are not generally incorporated into modern electrical systems, nor were
they in use during the 1920s. Because of the one-sidedness of the capacity problem
described here, individual utilities must rely upon idle reserves to serve peak load.
Thus, efforts to further integrate utilities into regional “super power” systems were
directed at minimizing the extent to which any given utility had to carry idle plant
and equipment.
3The propaganda campaign will be taken up in the following section.
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growing public power campaign.
Once the advisory board presented the Super Power proposal to a broader
coalition of utility executives support for the plan waned. Utility executives began to
perceive Super Power as a concept that ran against the interests of their respective
going concerns, especially when the matter of federal regulation was fiercely defended
by Barstow. As DeGraaf (1990, pg. 9) notes “Barstow maintained that federal
regulation of the system was essential because state regulation intended to have an
adverse effect on rate schedules. For the Super Power Corporation to be a financial
success, the prices charged for power needed to be competitive with existing utility
rate schedules.” At the outset executives that had initially supported the proposal
were under the assumption that Super Power would not be a source of competition.
Further on the question of federal regulation was a proposal for the Federal
Water Power Act of 1920 to be amended so that its regulatory purview extended
beyond hydroelectric power to conventional thermal plants and transmission lines.
Such a suggestion resulted in wholesale rejection of the plan by Sidney Mitchell,
president of Electric Bond and Share, who remarked, “there has been too much
irritating, restrictive, unwise, nagging regulation and direction of the details of things
in an un-businesslike way from the Departments in Washington for many years. There
is nothing I know of, unless it is bubonic plague or leprosy that business abhors and
dislikes more” (DeGraaf, 1990, pg. 10). The proposal for the establishment of a Super
Power Corporation was abandoned, but the recognition that the industry required
rationalization remained.
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Giant power
Morris Cook and Gifford Pinchot advanced an alternative mechanism of mar-
ket governance for the state of Pennsylvania. Giant Power would blend the principles
of scientific management and conservation with the recognized interdependence of the
machine process. Giant Power reflected the insights captured by Veblen in Engineers
and the Price System:
In effect, the progressive advance of this industrial system towards
an all-inclusive mechanical balance of interlocking processes appears
to be approaching a critical pass, beyond which it will no longer be
practicable to leave its control in the hands of businessmen working
at cross purposes for private gain, or to entrust its continued adminis-
tration to others than suitably trained technological experts, produc-
tion engineers without a commercial interest. What these men may
then do with it all is not so plain; the best they can do may not be
good enough; the negative proposition is becoming sufficiently plain,
that this mechanical state of the industrial arts will not long tolerate
the continued control of production by the vested interests under the
current businesslike rule of incapacity by advisement (Veblen, 1921,
quoted in Chase, 1933)
Murray and Cook were classmates at Lehigh University. They shared values
regarding the rationalization of electric power production and distribution. Ideolog-
ically, the two diverged. On the evaluation of Ontario’s public power program the
two disagreed. Ontario enjoyed lower rates than its New York neighbors, but its
plant and equipment were similar. When Murray published a report in 1922 falsely
claiming that rates in Ontario were just as high as in the U.S., Cooke “began to
doubt the ‘soundness’ of Murray’s attitudes toward interconnection”(DeGraaf, 1990,
pg. 17). Publicly Cooke criticized the Murray report, suggesting that it had been
influenced by NELA; privately, Cooke puzzled that Murray’s report was “the result
of the variety of speech which seems to come out whenever the electric industry meets
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the public. I never before heard you fall into this vernacular. I suppose this is where
I got my shock” (DeGraaf, 1990, pg. 18). Cooke’s suspicions would be confirmed
after the FTC found in 1934 that NELA had commissioned the report as part of
its larger, thoroughgoing propaganda campaign to dissipate the movement for public
power (Gruening, 1964, pp. 173 - 174).
Giant Power conceived of electricity as an emancipatory technology (Dick,
1973). Through rational electrification of a broad range of economic processes, the
spatial link between the factory and the community could be broken. Giant Power also
embodied a social promise, at least perceived by some of its supporters, of liberation
from the yoke of industrial capital. One critic claimed that electrification presented
society with a solemn choice: place the technology in the service of mankind, “[o]r, ...
surrender to the control of the greater machine, permit electricity to make permanent
what the steam-engine began, be happy in the roar of industry and lose all our sense
of freedom, justice and beauty” (Hart, quoted in Dick, 1973).
Joseph Hart, as Dick emphasizes (1973, pg. 10), viewed Giant Power as essen-
tial to overcoming the alienating effects of the labor process under capitalism. Indeed,
the machine process introduced a contradiction: while it increases the surplus of the
provisioning process, the “frequency, duration, intensity, grade, and sequence [of its
constituent processes] are not, in the main, matters for the free discretion of the indi-
viduals who participate” (Veblen, 1904) For Hart, and other Giant Power visionaries,
at least electricity offered a mechanism to break the direct connection between the
prime mover of the machine process, the steam engine, and allow for some amelio-
ration to the general feeling of alienation within it. Perhaps electricity, if controlled
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in the public interest, might grant the worker the means to escape the alienating
experience as “mere appendage” to the machine (Marx, 1983 [1867], pg. 645)
The FTC Study
While captains of industry were busy figuring the means to govern the mar-
ket for electricity, a popular movement had emerged in opposition to the private
encapsulation of the new, social technology. On February 9, 1925, Congress passed a
resolution directing the Federal Trade Commission to investigate the market structure
of the electric power industry and determine whether it was controlled by a “Power
Trust” (Funigiello, 1973). Sen. George W. Norris of Nebraska led a coalition of Pro-
gressives who managed to subscribe sufficient support for the resolution. In calling
for legislation to investigate what he perceived to be a corruption of the principle of
market competition, Norris proclaimed on the floor of the Senate:
I have been dumbfounded and amazed ... at the wonderful way in
which these subsidiary corporations reach out in every section of the
country, sometimes controlled by stock ownership, sometimes con-
trolled by interlocking directorates .... and the country will be dumb-
founded and amazed when it learns that practically everything in the
electric world, from something that perhaps costs no more than 25
cents to something that may cost millions of dollars, is controlled ei-
ther directly or indirectly by some part of this gigantic trust. (66
Cong. Rec. 1074, 1925)
In 1927 the FTC published its report titled Electric Power Industry, Control
of Power Companies (FTC, 1927). The specific language of the resolution authorized
a study of the “extent [to which] the General Electric Company, the stockholders or
other security holders thereof, either directly or indirectly through subsidiary com-
panies, stock ownership, or through other means and instrumentalities, monopolize
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or control of production, generation, or transmission electric energy or power....” In
other words, the FTC was to determine whether a network of corporate control within
the industry existed and whether it was centered on General Electric.
Much to the dismay of the anti-monopolists who had advanced the legislation,
the FTC concluded that there was insufficient evidence to substantiate the claim that
General Electric exercised effective control over the industry. Immediately, Senate
critics called for a congressional inquiry independent of the political forces that had
seemingly compromised the objectivity of the FTC. Funigiello (1973, pg. 7) notes that
suspicion of the FTC’s impartiality was justified in part by the fact that confidential
records of the holding companies were not examined. Rather, the commission drew
its conclusions primarily from questionnaires mailed to the executives of the parent
companies, which the local subsidiaries operated. A second FTC investigation was
authorized whose final report would reveal systematic abuses of the public trust on
the part of the public utility holding companies. However, some of the findings of the
first report merit comment.
While it was not found that General Electric, as a single going concern, had
managed to control the entire electric utility industry, it did provide evidence that
significant interconnectedness existed within the industry and that a central core
could clearly be identified. Figure 6 shows the interconnections that existed between
key stockholders and the large power groups that controlled the industry as a whole.
There are 50 nodes and 72 edges in total. The nodes may be decomposed into two sets
- a set of stockholders and a set of holding companies. Stockholders are depicted as
squares and holding companies as circles. The pattern of relations within the network
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as a whole yields distinct subgroups in which nodes are assigned membership. In this
case the subgroups are distinguished by color. Blue nodes delineate the subgroup
associated with General Electric and Electric Bond and Share (EBS) control of the
industry. Nodes in red suggest control by the American Superpower Corporation. The
remaining nodes in black do not suggest an obvious coherent control group, with the
Barstow, General Gas & Electric (GGE), and Middle West Utilities (MWU) relations
as notable exception. As president of GGE, Barstow owned 47.5% of common stock,
and was a member of the “Insull group” during the formative years of the industry
(Granovetter and McGuire, 1998; McGuire, Granovetter, and Schwartz, 1993). Thus
it is reasonable to suggest that a subgroup centered on Barstow may exist in this
network.
It is interesting to note that after abandoning the proposal for the federal
charter and regulation of the Super Power Corporation to administer a regional grid
in the U.S. Northeast, the same interests went on to incorporate the American Super-
power Corporation (ASC) represented by red in Figure 6. Mitchell, president of EBS,
served as a founding director of the ASC. Murray, the engineer behind the concept of
Super Power, also served on the board of ASC. Other board interlocks include EBS
stock ownership (10%) of ASC, which held minority interests in a number of utilities
not directly associated with the EBS and General Electric. A director of ASC, Frank
Hulswit, held 15.2% of the outstanding stock in American Light & Traction (ALT)
and 9.3% in United Light & Power, both of which were holding companies.
The data marshalled here on the degree of interconnectedness between indi-
vidual holding companies, operating companies and boards of directorates suggests
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Figure 6. Interconnections between holders of at least 1 percent stock in at least
two holding company power groups, or any one power group and General Electric.
Source: Table 16, S. Doc 213 (FTC, 1297)
that the business enterprise operating within the electric utility industry was part of
a larger community of interest. The industry was governed holistically. The point
and purpose of the concepts of Superpower or Giant Power was the recognition that
for the system to be rational and for the machine process to work efficiently, more
interconnectedness not less would have to be established. However, the men that con-
trolled these corporations and directed its market governance institutions preferred
to manage these affairs privately (Funigiello, 1973).
Progressives such as Norris failed to understand that this industry demanded
a high degree of concatenation, and so required cooperation to manage it4. West-
4The degree of interconnectedness among enterprises operating in the electric util-
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ern senators, described as “anti-monopolists,” wished to break them up into smaller
concerns. From a technical standpoint decentralization was feasible, as demonstrated
by the highly successful isolated plants that dominated the market for electricity
before their forced removal by the central station owners that came to control its
trade associations. However, evaluated against the standard of pecuniary efficiency,
going concerns engaged in the provisioning of electricity would be unable to admin-
ister going concern prices should the market become as competitive as its reformers
wished. John Kenneth Galbraith in The New Industrial State identifies the problem
succinctly:
[s]ize is the general servant of technology, not the special servant of
profits. The small firm cannot be restored to break the power of the
larger ones. It would require, rather, the rejection of the technol-
ogy which since earliest consciousness we are taught to applaud. It
would require that we have simple products made with simple equip-
ment from readily available materials with unspecialized labor. Then
the period of production would be short; the market would reliably
provide the labor, equipment and materials required for production;
there would be no other possibility or need for managing the market
for the finished product.... (1967, pg. 49)
For the present purpose Galbraith’s comment on the nature of business enterprise
in the modern age may be taken in reference to the system of business as a whole.
That the business enterprise tends to be large reflects the need to replace the market
with an institution capable of planning on a large-scale across a varied scope. In the
electrical industry, in particular, it is feasible to provision electricity efficiently with
individual plants distributed in a less centralized manner; however, size would still
be the “general servant” of the technology embodied in the whole system.
ity business is suggestive of oligopolistic cooperation. (Munkirs & Sturgeon, 1985)
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The interconnectedness of this holding company structure was the outcome of
a deliberate process that sought to institute and rationalize market governance. In
particular, the holding company mechanism of governance reflects the peculiar insti-
tutional history of the American legal system. Bonbright and Means (1932) argue
that the holding company may be sufficiently regarded as “American,” precisely be-
cause of the ways in which Americans have tried to control the excesses of corporate
abuse. Rather than embracing both the machine and pecuniary logic of large com-
bines as market governance institutions, such as the case in the European tradition,
legislation like the Sherman Antitrust Act, anachronistically, appeals instead to the
ideology of liberalism and its economic expression in laissez-faire. That is to say, by
making concerns smaller and forcing competition, the market was expected to yield
a set of prices that were “fair”, thereby restoring its ability to allocate the social
product.
Public power
Because of the abuses of the public utility holding companies a national move-
ment emerged that sought to wrest control of the industry from these private entities
and place it in public hands5. Formation of municipal utilities occurred in cities
throughout the United States at the dawn of the industry itself. However, despite
5While it may be said the state constitutes, sui generis, a situation apart from
each person embedded in society, it does not proceed on its own purpose. Dewey
resists such reification by arguing “the public has no hands except those of private
individual human beings,” suggesting instead the problem lies in the methods by
which the valuation structure situates the relationship between private and public on
the question of provisioning (Dewey, 1927, pp. 81-82).
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early gains municipally owned concerns were unable to build sufficient momentum
to dislodge the power of private control. While the number of municipal systems
grew as a percentage of the total industry from 22.5% in 1902 to 52.6% in 1932,
its share of output remained miniscule, never breaching 5% (Dick, 1973, pg. 65).
Despite its limited share of the market, private utilities nevertheless waged war on
municipal systems because of the threat to its ideological structure they posed. Dick
(1973) writes, “one might conclude that the private utilities were guilty of overkill
in a propaganda campaign designed to discredit public ownership in the 1920’s given
the slight proportion of the energy market in public hands. Yet, the important fact
was that public ownership was sufficiently established that it could not be dismissed
as mere theory.”
Several examples of successful municipal systems were found in prominent
cities like Los Angeles, Cleveland, and Seattle and Tacoma in the Pacific Northwest
(Dick, 1973). These latter cities on the Puget Sound would pose a special threat in
the ensuing debate over public power. Tacoma, in particular, was cited as having
lower rates for electricity than any other place in the United States (Dick, 1973). The
municipal system, Seattle City Light, operated adjacent to Puget Sound Power &
Light, a private utility, offering a means to compare rates for equivalent service. In
Seattle the two enterprises competed for market share on the basis of rates. Seattle
City Light would set rates sufficient to reproduce itself, albeit, much lower than Puget
Sound Power & Light in the absence of its municipal competition. The latter concern
would be forced to follow. However, rates outside of Seattle, but still within Puget
Sound Power & Light service area, were significantly higher. As Dick (1973) points
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out “a five room house in 1924 could be [provisioned] with an average of 518 kWh
per month. The private company charged $8.98 for service in Seattle. In Bellingham,
it charged $17.80 for the same service, in Puyallup, $18.55, and $32.50 in Aberdeen.”
The Seattle experience fueled the campaign for public power.
As a collective body the private utilities did not ignore the threat of successful
municipal ownership. NELA, the industry’s trade association, had organized a so-
phisticated campaign that sought to counter and dissipate the movement for public
power. In 1927 its Public Policy Committee received a field report which stated:
The Seattle situation is of national importance. Seattle has the second-
largest municipal plant in the country. Its rates are continually cited
as lower than those charged by privately owned plants. ... At a time
when active proposals are being made – to extend the activities of
Government in business in other localities, the claim of successful re-
sults of such a policy in Seattle is dangerous and requires refutation.
(NELA, quoted in Dick, 1973 ,pg. 67).
What Ernest Gruening (1964 ) claims as “the most highly organized peace-time
effort to shape public opinion in the United States,” began at Samuel Insull’s sugges-
tion in 19196. On the question of ownership over electric utilities, Insull instructed the
executives under his command to “[g]et busy and do something,” suggesting the in-
dustry proactively develop a propaganda program (Gruening, 1964, pg. 18). Shortly
thereafter the Illinois Committee on Public Utility Information was organized and
began a campaign to inundate every facet of public life with views favorable to on-
going control of the industry by the private utilities (Gruening, 1964, pg. 19). By
6Gruening’s invective draws from the findings of the FTC, whose investigators
concluded that measured by quantity, extent, and cost, this is probably the greatest
peacetime propaganda campaign ever conducted of private interests in this country.
(Dick, pg. 45)
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1921 the Committee, headed by an Insull man, had distributed five million pieces
of literature targeted for specific audiences ranging from newspaper editors, business
leaders, lawyers, teachers, members of the clergy, librarians, students of all ages, and
trusted stewards of government at all levels (Gruening, 1964, pg. 19).
The propaganda campaign became instituted into NELA as a core function of
market governance (Dick, 1973; Funigiello, 1973; Gruening, 1964). The threat of pub-
lic ownership undermined the complex network of liability structures that provided
the basis of capitalization for the industry as a whole. As Dick (1973, pg. 46) puts
it, “the power and light industry was already a multi-billion dollar business in the
Twenties and the Electric Age was just dawning. There was figuratively gold in those
franchises and more to be spun from the webs of the holding companies.” Control
over the market for electricity, and hence control over the futurity of the complex of
asset values deriving from its private ownership, hinged upon reproducing the public
faith in the sanctity of private ownership.
The stakes extended beyond the going concern. Rather, whether a movement
toward public power could be quelled affected all interests vested in public service
corporations. Goodwill emerges as a communal situation that derives from a harmony
of interests on whichever end of the transaction one lies in regards to the provisioning
of electricity. One industry executive remarked at a NELA address:
The key issue in America today is whether the American people desire
to preserve the institution of individual rights in property or substitute
therefor [sic] community ownership supervised by a socialist oligarchy.
This country can not [sic] exist half socialist and half free any more
[sic] than It could have existed half slave and half free. (Henry Swift
Ives, quoted in Dick, pg. 46)
Whether or not most executives understood the nature of class as well as Ives
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is unclear. However, the actions of NELA in its sustained campaign reveal a consensus
among its leadership that “control of public opinion was ... essential in the battle
to assure the triumph of private enterprise” (Dick, pg. 47). Specifically, the utility
executives sought to guide the public mind in adopting an ideology that viewed the
interests of the utility as identical with those of the public at large. President of
Portland Electric Power Company (PEPCO), Franklin T. Griffith, declared to NELA
on the matter, “[a]n attack on the principles for which we [the utilities] stand is an
attack upon our government itself” (Gruening, 1964, pg. 26).
Taken in the context of the propaganda scheme as a whole, we may interpret
Griffith to mean the concepts of “General Will” or “public good” when he refers
to government. For the layperson to whom the persuasion efforts were directed,
government and the General Will were likely conceptually identical. Thus, Griffith’s
deceit served the end of creating the harmony of interests the utilities sought to
achieve. Yet, from the standpoint of the utility executive, and from the experience of
capitalist development in general, an attack on the principles upon which the utility
stands are also an attack on government itself, the latter instituted largely to protect
the interests of the propertied classes. Indeed, the propaganda campaign was held to
be in the best interest of the public by utility managers; accordingly, the public paid
the bill7
The experience of the farmer fueled further the public power movement. Dick
7The second FTC investigation revealed that NELA’s extensive propaganda cam-
paign was expensed to the rate-base of the underlying operating companies that
comprised its system (Gruening, 1964).
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(1973, page 78) notes that “when the private power companies provided rural service,
the farmer was required to pay the cost of the extensions. The companies then
incorporated the additions into their rate base. [Senator] Bone: ‘thereafter the poor
farmer had to pay interest and dividends on his gift which became a part of the capital
structure of the company and this ran into an enormous sum in the state.’”
In 1930 a number of anti-power politicians were elected to office. By 1930 the
“Power Trust” had become a serious issue in politics. As Dick (1973, pg. 2) notes,
“[e]lection victories of Edward Costigan in Colorodo, George Norris in Nebraska, Gif-
ford Pinchot in Pennsylvania, Philip LaFollette in Wisconsin, and Franklin Roosevelt
in New York reflected in part an awakening on the power issue.” The power issue
found support in the Northwest (Dick, 1973). Washington and Oregon each passed
measures designed to promote the development of public power, although Washing-
ton’s version of the law would prove to be more conducive to checking the power of
private utilities through the remainder of the 20th century.
Public Power in the Northwest
The PNW occupied a central space in the fight for public power. Tacoma
and Seattle boasted successful municipal utilities, providing much of the impetus for
NELA’s propaganda campaign. However, aside from these Puget Sound cities, the
region was provisioned, if at all, by the holding company system described as the
Power Trust (see Figure 7 for a map of the fields of control for the major power
groups). Local operating companies such as, PEPCO (formerly Portland General
Electric), Northwestern, and Washington Water Power Co., were used by absentee
owners to extract rates in excess of cost recovery and a “reasonable” mark-up. The
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practice of inflating the rate base by issuing liabilities, either between other utili-
ties, parent companies, or to banks embedded in the holding company network, for
purposes unrelated to the actual provisioning of electricity left the consumer feeling
pinched. Allegations of stock watering and “overcapitalization” drew the ire of local
politicians, like Charles M. Thomas in Oregon (MacColl, 1979).
Figure 7. Division of market for electricity in the PNW by power group in the
holding company system.
Source: Federal Trade Commission (1927)
As the state’s sole public utility commissioner8 Thomas led the public power
8Oregon’s public utility commission is peculiar in this regard. Thomas was ap-
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fight in Oregon. In 1933 Commissioner Thomas addressed the people of Portland
on the power issue, focusing on the ways in which communities were controlled and
exploited by remote holding companies and financial institutions. Thomas described
the chain of ownership that linked the Portland area’s utilities (coincidentally its
most important enterprises) with large, eastern corporations such as AT&T, Central
Public Service Company, and Electric Bond & Share, resulting in a financial tribute
to New York. While the picture was more complicated and nuanced than he ex-
pressed, Thomas did identify the root of the problem: the Northwest was dominated
by corporations whose interest in provisioning electricity to the region was ancillary
to the primary aim of generating capital gains (MacColl, 1979). Figure 8 captures
the frustration by a lack of local control over utilities.
pointed by Governor Julius Meier, who had run on a public power platform. Meier
faced political opposition in 1923 from the Ku Klux Klan when attempting to run for
local office in Portland, who opposed him on the basis of anti-Semitism. Johansen
and Gates (1967) suggest that the KKK in Oregon had been organized by the pri-
vate utility companies to distract the public from economic issues. One observers
held that Klan leadership in Oregon was “closely allied with certain electric light and
power corporations, and it is common gossip among politicians that it was organized
, or encouraged, as a counter-irritant against reform movements which might impair
the corporate interests” (Johansen and Gate, 1967, pg. 497). Another editorialized,
”[t]he Klan in Oregon represents the capitalization of religious prejudices and racial
animosity by public service corporations as the means of sidetracking the public mind
from economic issues. With the people foolishly fighting over religion and fanning
the fires of fanaticism, they have forgotten all about agitation against 8 cent street
car fares, high telephone and other service rates and reduced wage scales ” (Putman,
cited in Johansen and Gates, 1967, pg. 497)
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Figure 8. Depiction of the Power Trust as it affected life in Portland, Or.
MacColl (1979). Reproduced with permission.
Bonneville Power Administration and Regionalism
In the 1930s there was a feeling in the PNW that corporations, such as the pub-
lic utilities, stood in the way of the full development of the region as an autonomous
space. The region was colonial appendage to the core of eastern capital (Nash, 1990;
Robbins, 1994). Progressives envisioned a regional development program, centered
on harnessing the power of the Columbia River that would move them closer to the
core, while retaining its distinct regional identity.
Looking backward the regional identity of the PNW is tied most closely to the
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Columbia River. But, this conception does not obtain by natural law. As Eve Vo-
gel (2011) argues, “the seeming naturalness of the ideas of region and river, together
with the variability of the broader cultural conception of the Pacific Northwest region,
hides the political construction and embedded content of this particular, and partic-
ularly influential, regional notion. [emphasis in original]” The regional conception
that frames the working rules for the provisioning process today extends beyond the
Columbia River basin, a conception that embodies the literal reach of the Bonneville
Power Administration’s transmission grid.
Vogel’s work is especially useful for grounding this analysis as a contribution
to theorizing about the social provisioning process. Building on “a large and growing
geographic literature that argues compellingly that all places, boundaries, territories,
and even geographic scales are socially constructed and politically contested,” Vogel
(2011) challenges the idyllic notion of the Pacific Northwest as trusted steward of the
watershed as a natural resource. In this case, organizing a set of social technologies
so that the Columbia River becomes a resource, establishing a region in which the
BPA is central in its governance nexus, and asserting control of this resource implies
the articulation of the social product deriving from this process is discretionary and
partial.
Efforts to define the Pacific Northwest began in the 1930s. New Deal policies in
the West were conditioned, in part, by the visions of regionalist planners (Dick, 1973;
Dorman, 2003, 2012; Vogel, 2011). Regionalists sought relief from the ill effects of
uneven development: while development was concentrated in the cities, the rural areas
suffered from price instability for farm products as well as a net population outflow
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(Vogel, 2011). The contrast between town and country was evaluated against a broad
set of criteria that envisioned what the good life entailed. While more prosperous,
cities were overcrowded and mired in squalor. The countryside offered refuge from
the filth and despair of the metropole, albeit for a lack of economic opportunity.
Conceiving of the whole region as the site of economic development suggested a
more balanced means of achieving prosperity, allowing for “dispersed industry, strong
cultural ties, thriving rural areas, and healthy environments. New technologies of
long-distance electric transmission and automobiles could disperse the benefits of
industry into the healthful countryside” (Vogel, 2011).
In 1933 Charles W. Eliot, head of Public Work Administration’s National
Planning Board (PWA), vested Marshall Dana with the authority to organize a re-
gional planning board in the Pacific Northwest (Vogel, 2011). The Pacific Northwest
Regional Planning Commission (PNWRPC) emerged as the institution responsible
for defining the “river-region bond” that would ultimately provide the point of de-
parture for the rationalization of the Columbia River and the establishment of the
BPA as its chief governance institution (Vogel, 2011). Between 1933 and 1935, how-
ever, the process of defining the Pacific Northwest as a coherent region was politically
contested: at least six different conceptions emerged each envisioning provisioning in
different ways.
At first the Pacific Northwest was defined by the four state (Oregon, Wash-
ington, Idaho, and Montana) planning district established by the PWA (Vogel, 2007,
2011). Another conception would propose to drop the state of Montana, focusing
instead on Oregon, Washington, and Idaho. The three state alternative originat-
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ing from Washington DC was contested in the PNWRPC based in Portland. Vogel
(2011) suggests that separation of Montana from its neighbors to the west threatened
to drive a wedge between vested interests in the region and discretion over the future
of its resources. The upper basin of the Columbia River lies, in part, within the
political boundaries of western Montana. Additionally, two privately owned electric
utilities, Montana Power Company and Washington Water Power Company, wished
for Montana to remain part of the Pacific Northwest so that decisions over the ques-
tion of a shared power grid remained within their reach. The federal government
favored a regional conception defined by the Columbia River basin itself, because its
constitutional jurisdiction over navigable waters had already been established (Vogel,
2011). To identify the Pacific Northwest with the Columbia River basin would prove
politically infeasible, as much of the Washington political and economic elite centers
upon the cities of Seattle and Tacoma, which lie outside the basin. Furthermore,
a significant part of the upper basin extends into Canada, suggesting the need for
international cooperation for regional planning efforts.
Other visions of the Pacific Northwest would involve consideration of certain
market boundaries. Most notable was an attempt to define the Pacific Northwest by
its fisheries. Vogel (2011) writes, “[t]he best opportunity to build a Pacific Northwest
region from existing interjurisdictional cooperation and shared ecologies might have
been a fisheries region centered on southern British Columbia’s Fraser River and the
binational Puget Sound, potentially stretching from Alaska to California.” Again,
questions of control over governance would thwart the fisheries centered regional con-
ception. This time, however, international coordination was less of a concern than
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federal intrusion over state authority of fisheries.
The notion of a trade region emerged centered upon the cities of Portland,
Seattle, Tacoma, Spokane, and Vancouver, BC. Business leaders in Portland lobbied
most intensely for the trade region conception, just as they did in the nineteenth
century when men of finance, navigation, and railroads sought to control the course of
development. The trade region concept was unable to galvanize widespread support,
because it was inconsistent with the ideals of the planners who sought to envision a
regionalist course of development in the first place. Conceiving of a regional economy
in which the major urban centers would continue to be most central would reinforce
the sharp contrast between metropolis and hinterland that had already been identified
as a social problem (Vogel, 2011).
The threat of losing control to national planners brought forth a new attempt
to settle the question of regional unity (Vogel, 2011). When the newly established
Water Resources Committee (WRC) began its nationwide inventory of watershed re-
sources, the Northwest was to be surveyed on the presumption that it was constituted
by the Oregon, Washington, Idaho definition. PNWRPC planners feared that such a
survey would cement the exclusion of Montana, urging them to resolve in 1935 that
“the area drained by the Columbia River, and its tributaries extending to all four of
the Pacific Northwest states, comprises a social and economic unit that ought not be
divided or torn apart.” Out of this unity would emerge a socially constructed, river-
region unity. That unity would form the basis for the region’s claim to the resources
deriving from stewardship of the rivers, and create the space in which the BPA would
exert its influence and power over the river going forward.
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While the BPA was established in 1937, funds were appropriated in 1934
for the construction of its namesake dam at the Cascades. The Bonneville Dam
was conceived as a multiple purpose dam, with navigation and power production as
its primary objectives. Two factors contribute to the primacy of navigation in its
construction. First, the legitimacy for the Federal Government to appropriate funds
for the project was established by the Federal Water Power Act of 1920, which rested
upon the interpretation that the Commerce Clause granted Congress the authority to
promote the development of navigable rivers. Second, private interests in the region
have long been vested in the development of navigation improvements. Enterprises
in the Inland Empire sought development of the Columbia and Snake so that cities
like Lewiston, Idaho could find markets for their output (Petersen, 1995). Efforts to
improve navigation on the Columbia River may be traced back to the days of the
Oregon Steam Navigation Company (Dana, 1915). Hence, it may be argued that the
BPA forms part of an institutional continuum reaching back to the early navigation
interests in the region. More generally, the BPA emerges from a social fabric in which
the Columbia River is central.
Funigiello (1973, pg. 174) notes that “Bonneville Dam was the first of the
federal projects designed to improve navigation and to develop hydroelectric power
on the Columbia River.” The Bonneville Dam project was part of the Roosevelt Ad-
ministration’s New Deal, which emphasized conservation and development of natural
resources as a means of economic development for the West. In 1932 Roosevelt, while
stumping through Stumptown9, gave a landmark speech on the subject of public
9Stumptown is one of Portland’s many nicknames.
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power, known today within the BPA as the “yardstick speech.” Power produced by
the dams on the Columbia River would provide a “yardstick” against which private
electric rates would be anchored. Such yardstick rates were conceived of as going
concern prices: the rate for power administered to the market would be sufficient to
reproduce the going concern, in this case the BPA, but not to provide for payments to
absentee owners. The rates would provide for cost recovery, to include debt service,
but no more (Funigiello, 1973, pg.174). Bolstering the public power movements in
the Pacific Northwest, Roosevelt declared:
where a community - a city or county or district - is not satisfied with
the service rendered or the rates charged by the private utility, it has
the undeniable basic right, as one of its functions of Government, one
of its functions of home rule, to set up, after a fair referendum of its
voters has been had, its own governmentally owned and operated ser-
vice....The very fact that a community can, by vote of the electorate,
create a yardstick of its own, will, in most cases, guarantee good ser-
vice and low rates to its population. (Roosevelt, quoted in McColl,
1979, pg. 438)
The Pacific Northwest would be an instrumental part of Roosevelt’s New Deal.
As a coherent region the Northwest would be the single most important hydroelectric
resource on the North American continent (Dick, 1973, pg. 117). If developed, the
Columbia River with all its tributaries made up 40% of the nation’s hydroelectric
potential. Looking to the future, Roosevelt invoked the “specter of the private utility
past,” which stirred the public passion against such abuses as NELA’s propaganda
campaign, the tendency to over-capitalize the operating companies, and the financial
fragility embodied in pyramid holding company structures (Dick, 1973, pp.117-118).
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Toward a new provisioning process: BPA and Qualitative Change.
With the construction of Bonneville and Grand Coulee Dams, the BPA was
established to institutionalize regional coordination of the river as a whole so that
these projects might fulfill the hopes of its regionalist planners. Bonneville provided
navigation and power benefits to the lower Columbia River, while Grand Coulee would
electrify and “make the desert bloom” in the Inland Empire.
The BPA would ultimately reorganize the social provisioning process so that
the quantity relations, as expressed by its circular production schema, would reflect
a greater reliance on electricity produced by the Organic Machine (White, 1996),
and less reliance on a world market for its primary commodity exports. The larger
scheme in establishing the BPA was to preside over a development strategy whereby
the region would develop a greater degree of independence, and engage in high value-
added production for which electricity would be a primary input.
After the funds for the Bonneville dam had been approved Washington Sen.
Clarence Dill of Spokane articulated the response within the region:
With cheap electricity on the farms, in the homes, in the stores, in the
factories, and on the highways and the railroads, we shall build the
greatest electrical empire here in the Northwest the world has ever
known. (Dill, quoted in Dick, 1973, pg.142)
In 1934 Roosevelt returned to the northwest to “bestow his blessings on the two
dams,” inaugurating the emergence of a new system of social provisioning centered
upon an electrified machine process (Dick, 1973, pg.142). Roosevelt’s intention was
to develop the Northwest as a region that could support a much larger population.
The dams would reestablish the frontier of the West. Cheap, federal power would
institute a new social frontier, in which the promise of, what Aziz Rana (2010)refers
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to as, “settler freedom” would be renewed.
The development of the Columbia River for hydroelectric power promised more
than a yardstick for the price of electricity. As Congressman Charles Henry Martin
remarked on the approval of the Bonneville project to the Portland Realty Board,
“this power which the government will develop at Bonneville Dam is not intended
to force down the rates of existing power companies. This power is intended for the
great chemical and metallurgical reduction plants whose first consideration is cheap
power and an inexhaustible supply” (Dick, 1973, pg.190) Whatever the dreams of
the regionalists for an electric utopia on the Columbia, the river would be placed
in service for the production of light metals in the following decade, as the Organic
Machine is used to fuel the war machine.
In the early days of the BPA, aluminum manufacturers in the Pacific Northwest
would be the largest single purchasers of its output. The production of aluminum
became systemically important to the regional economy with the advent of World War
II (Miller, 1957). The decision to produce airplanes and ships in the Northwest had the
effect of reorienting the provisioning process: a production complex emerged within
the region centered on the hydroelectric output of Bonneville and Grand Coulee dams.
The Bonneville Power Administration sold the output of this electricity to Alcoa and
Henry Kaiser (the shipbuilder). Alcoa, in turn, sold its output to Boeing, which sold
its output to the federal government to wage war on Germany and Japan. It was
demand from the federal government for ships and planes that created the industries
that presided over postwar economic expansion in the region, and constitutes the
point of departure for subsequent diversification of production. This diversification
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of production succeeded in breaking the yoke of colonial dependence on the east
(Nash, 1990).
Prior to 1941 the production of aluminum did not enter into the regional econ-
omy in an important way. Since air superiority was a critical element of Allied strategy
to win the war, aluminum soared in importance between 1940 and 1945 (Nash 1990,
see Table 3). Production of aluminum is an electricity intensive process, providing an
economic reason for its plant and equipment to be located in the Northwest, so that
it may benefit from the abundance of cheap hydroelectric power from Bonneville and
Grand Coulee.
Table 3. Aluminum Production 1940 to 1947.
Year
U.S.
(1,000 tons)
PNW
(1,000) tons
Regional
Share
1940 206.5 5 2%
1941 309.1 67 22%
1942 521.1 148 28%
1943 920.2 252 27%
1944 776.4 281 36%
1945 495.1 203 41%
1946 409.6 148 36%
1947 571.8 265 46%
Source: Miller (1957)
With this surge in demand for aluminum New Deal planners did not want to
simply deliver the economic gains to Alcoa. On the question of how best to proceed
in increasing the production of aluminum, Harold Ickes said, “I do not believe that
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we should invest all this money for national defense purposes and end up either by
treating the Pacific Northwest as a colony or by making a Christmas present of all
our expensive facilities to the Aluminum Company” (Nash, 1990, pg. 95). It was the
prerogative of Ickes to build aluminum production plants in the Northwest so that
not only would the federal government retain more control over the production of
aluminum for the purposes of war mobilization, but also to leave the Northwest with
a lasting resource that it could then claim as its own. Ickes appeared to understand
the basic intuition behind structural independence between industries:
[i]t should be pointed out... That, although it is both desirable and
necessary that aluminum reduction plants be located in the Northwest
near available resources of public power, this location would place a
heavy burden upon the nation unless fabricating plants were also lo-
cated in that region. At the present time, alumina produced from
bauxite is shipped from Mobile and East St. Louis to the North-
west, it is then reduced to pig aluminum; the pig aluminum is then
transported to fabricating plants in the East; the fabricated metals
are sent back in huge quantities to the Pacific coast - and even to
the Northwest itself-for airplane manufacture. The shuttle system is
obviously expensive. More important, it adds a terrific burden to our
critically overladen transportation system. It seems to me to be es-
sential that proper action be taken to locate sufficient of these plants
in Northwest... thereby avoiding these long cross hauls (Nash, 1990,
pg. 95)
On the question of siting a large sheet rolling mill in Spokane Washington,
Ronald Miller (1957), claims that “during the aluminum crisis of World War II,
government agencies selected a general West Coast site for one large sheet mill to
supply the Seattle Boeing plants and several other large aircraft factories in the
Los Angeles area. The choice of a location in Eastern Washington (over Southern
California which was closer to the larger sheet consumers) was based on ‘strategic
defense considerations’ and ‘freer labor availability of the Spokane area’.”
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Miller (1957) seeks an explanation for why the plant was sited in Spokane,
rather than Southern California, based upon a criteria of cost minimization. However,
examining the motives of New Deal planners, such as Harold Ickes, reveals that cost
minimization was only part of the story: establishing a complement of light metals
manufacturers, among other industries, in the Pacific Northwest, to draw upon the
surplus power of Bonneville and Grand Coulee, was ultimately about making good on
the promise to develop the region as an industrial center. Whereas easterners viewed
the West as a vast source of natural resources to be exploited, Ickes understood
that it would require federal intervention to encourage more “balanced economic
development” to provide the region the means to escape this value drain (Nash, 1990,
pg. 146).
Ickes envisioned a post-scarcity economy enabled by conservation. The mean-
ing of conservation varies between the New Dealer and the modern environmentalist;
conservation, for Ickes, Pinchot, or Cooke, meant rational employment of the joint
stock of knowledge applied to the problem of social provisioning. For Ickes, con-
servation implied maximizing production, using the best methods, while minimizing
the waste involved with harvesting so-called natural resources for sale as primary
commodities. For a river like the Columbia to run free ran afoul of the principal
of conservation, a somewhat absurd conclusion to the modern ecologist facing the
problem of salmon conservation. Nevertheless, the practical matter facing the nation
and the region during the period in which Harold Ickes managed the Department of
Interior, was providing resources for those that needed them. Conservation, then,
emerges as the policy expression of the theoretical notion of “fertility” employed in
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the surplus approach.
The vision of conservation in the Northwest would find an opponent in the
War Production Board (WPB). Nash (1990, pg.148) notes:
the perception of the West as a purveyor of raw materials to the
East did not fade quickly, particularly in the East. There representa-
tives of established industries assumed that the colonial relationship
would continue. Self-interest impelled and protected the status quo.
And their power was considerable. Executives from large corpora-
tions dominated many wartime federal agencies, especially the War
Production Board, which became a chief antagonist of the Ickes pro-
gram.
Ickes and Paul Raver, the second Administrator of the BPA, believed that the
WPB was shortsighted. With Boulder Dam, Grand Coulee, and the first powerhouse
at Bonneville the WPB was not convinced that additional generators would be nec-
essary to power the Western shipyards. Ickes and Raver were thinking to the future
of the region, however. They wanted additional generating capacity at Bonneville
to ensure a ready supply of power to fuel the post-war regional development they
envisioned (Nash, 1990, pg. 148). However, increased demand for power to fuel the
war effort forced the WPB to yield.
Conclusion
In part, the New Dealers succeeded. The Columbia’s watershed has been
rationalized. Thirty-one federal dams on the Columbia and its tributaries comprise a
system with a nameplate capacity of 22,061 MW - roughly equivalent to twenty-two
nuclear plants. While the system typically does not achieve this level of peak output,
its potential exists. Yet, this Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS) creates
more than electric resources. The FCRPS also provides water for irrigation in the arid
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region east of the Cascades. Its multiple purpose dams allow for navigation through
the myriad canal and locks at Bonneville, The Dalles, John Day, and the lower Snake
River projects. The massive storage projects in the upper basin (Libby and Hungry
Horse), provide for flood control, so that devastations such as that witnessed in the
1948 flood at Vanport are the stuff of history10.
The New Dealers got their dams and remade the Pacific Northwest (Nash,
1990). Metallurgical industries emerged in the region as a result of the power from
these dams and the will of their planners. As Miller (1957) puts it, “the aluminum
expansion in the Pacific Northwest during World War II was not merely the growth
of an existing industrial situation but rather a fundamental change in the economic
complex of the region.” The electric needs of the war, as Nash (1990, pg. 150) argues,
“had created a foundation for more extended and diversified economic growth.” But,
White (1994) contends, that in spite of all the new possibilities, the Organic Machine
10A flood washed away the city of Vanport in 1948. Vanport, now part of Portland,
was built to house the tens of thousands of workers that engaged in the shipbuilding
industry during the war (Nash, 1990). After the war the city remained. Flood waters
overtook the levees at Vanport and inundated the city. Vanport was a primarily black
community, that no longer exists. Presently, a racetrack, golf course, and wetlands
occupy its former site. Displaced persons from Vanport settled in other parts of North
Portland after the flood. Ironically, a new kind of flood is washing them away once
again. White, middle-class “hipsters” currently fuel a gentrification process, as they
flee the boredom of corporate, suburban America. In Portland’s old, working-class
neighborhoods a quaint mix of post-industrial grit, streetcar mixed-use development,
and relatively inexpensive housing stock have attracted waves of settlers from the
region and beyond, all of whom see themselves as seeking refuge from the horrors of
mainstream society. The outcome has been an explosion in rents, causing an exodus
of non-white residents to more affordable parts of the city. More research on this
process is warranted.
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was narrowly employed in the service of generating electricity for the aluminum com-
panies in the decades that followed. The market foreclosed on the agrarian promise
of irrigated small-holdings in the Columbia Basin: falling prices led to increased pres-
sure to relax the restrictions on acreage blocks, so that agribusiness could realize scale
economies (White, 1996, pp. 70-71).
Creating a resource from a river opens a range of questions regarding qual-
itative change in the provisioning process. In truth, taming the mighty Columbia
created new possibilities for the region to assert itself as an independent community,
with a development path of its own. Integrating the waters of the Columbia into the
machine process allowed for the production of a new set of surplus goods that, for
better or worse, fueled a postwar economic expansion in the region. The production
of cheap electricity, to this day, insulates the ratepayers of the region from some of
the price gouging that has plagued other communities in America, notably its Pacific
neighbors to the South.
And yet the presence of all those dams, ceaselessly rationalizing the violence
of the watershed, renders unviable the possibility of an earlier provisioning process.
The non-capitalist, economic system of the first peoples of the region was centered
upon the ceremonial reproduction of the salmon run. While qualitatively distinct,
the provisioning process embedded in the social systems of the tribes of the Columbia
River basin was viable, as we understand viability to be the criterion for an economic
system to reproduce itself. This system was regarded as primitive, undeveloped, and
backward, yet it yielded a surplus and provisioned its participants accordingly. The
key difference lies in the orientation of its social relations of production: in the native
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system, natives were central. In the current system, they are not. To build the present
system required the forced removal of natives from their ancestral land, inundation
of their ancestral fishing sites, and the destruction of habit for the salmon. This dam
machine killed fascists. But, it killed a way of life, too.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The essays within this dissertation constitute a contribution to the heterodox
surplus approach (Lee and Jo, 2011), which seeks to identify the mechanisms by
which societies reproduce the social and economic relationships that form the basis
of their provisioning processes. Once the surplus is no longer taken as given, agency
emerges from the space in which it is lost to abstraction when one considers problems
of reproduction and viability in the aggregate alone. The question then concerns how
the provisioning process changes in relation to the actions of individuals who exercise
discretion over the scale and scope of the surplus. Traditionally, this issue has been
addressed quantitatively so that agency becomes linked to effective demand, in which
case the surplus is determined by those in control of the business enterprise. Instead,
the dissertation has explored the qualitative aspects of the structure-agency problem
as it concerns social provisioning, by interrogating the mechanisms that transformed
the Pacific Northwest into a capitalist economy.
Because the method of inquiry in this dissertation has sought to avoid reduc-
tionism, essentialism, reification, and functional teleology, the emergence of capitalism
is not taken as inevitable. To understand how one viable system is displaced by an-
other requires a framework in which provisioning is viewed as subject to ongoing
social construction. Put another way, given the articulations of social relations that
provide coherence to a given system of provisioning, some persons emerge as central
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with respect to the community who possess the power to act in an institutional ca-
pacity. Central actors, in this regard, are capable of initiating a set of processes that
move the provisioning process away from a period of stable reproduction, toward a
state in which a new set of relations are selected on the basis of their fitness with the
new situation. In some cases, the possibility of systemic failure exists suggesting a
period of maximal dislocation, to use J. Fagg Foster’s language (1981). It has been
shown here that such institutional change required the use of force and fraud to effect
wholesale change toward a system of capitalist provisioning.
The essays herein have sought to construct a narrative concerning the ways in
which some persons possessed the power to change an economic system in reference
to the Columbia River basin. This narrative has been traced from the emergence of
the railroads in the region to finance capital in the East, with the understanding that
the economic process unfolds, historically, as a relational problem. Each development
constitutes a growth in the cumulative development of the whole system, so that from
the vantage point of history one may look back and see a network of relations grow.
Beginning with railroads we may trace these relationships from the Columbia River
to the electric utility industry, networks of finance, supranational corporate processes,
and the popular resistance. Railroad development construction was chosen as the en-
try point due to the durable nature of the plant and equipment, as well as the ways in
which actors embedded in the social networks that developed around railroad finance
sought to validate its liability structures. In doing so, this particular time and place,
which otherwise seems to be set apart from world history, is drawn into a broader
narrative about capitalist development in general. The capitalist transformation of
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the Pacific Northwest serves as a single moment in a larger process that is global in
nature.
The first essay demonstrates that qualitative change in the structure of the
economic system, in the final analysis, originates with the actions of persons embedded
in social networks. Henry Villard was chosen as an historical figure of interest precisely
because he stands at the central juncture of many processes that conferred upon him
the institutional capacity to act with transformational efficacy. In this way Villard
serves as a concrete example of the abstract notion of the absentee owner, who in the
age of the credit economy is vested with the right to direct the levers of society in
the course of development. Villard becomes Schumpeter’s “ephor of capitalism.”
The first essay also demonstrates that unseating the non-capitalist economy,
which had been viable in the region, required force and fraud. The building of the
railroads in the West embodied the violence of imperialism, concealed by an ideology
that placed white settlers at the end of history. The heroes of the story, undertakers
like Henry Villard and Ben Holliday, moved within a social space created by fraud.
To establish the viability conditions for the new economy, both in material and pe-
cuniary aspect, men like Villard peddled untruths that the West was an un-peopled
place; an Eden awaiting the light of Christendom. The Willamette Eden was a social
construction designed to create a euphoric wave of immigration to Oregon country,
directing some of the migration that had embodied the doctrine of Manifest Destiny
to the region served by the Portland metropole.
The second essay establishes that the electric utility, as a going concern,
emerges directly from the finance-railroad nexus. In particular, tracing further the
119
relationship between the Columbia River, Henry Villard and the railroads in the re-
gion, it is shown that development of the Pacific Northwest, as a concrete space, and
the electric utility, as a new situation, were interlinked processes. Whereas in essay
one the method of analysis proceeds in fine detail, attempting to disaggregate the
provisioning process to identify individual social relations and subject them to anal-
ysis, essay two proceeds at a higher level of abstraction so that the co-development
of the region and the utility may be placed in a global context.
The third essay examines the relationship between market governance in the
electric utility industry and the institutionalization of the capitalist machine process
in the Pacific Northwest. In particular, it is shown that a central aspect of governance
involved the shaping of public opinion over the legitimacy of private control and
ownership over electric technology. In response to the perceived rapacity of the private
utility empires, a movement for public power emerged, resulting in the development of
the Columbia River for hydroelectric power, as well as navigation, and irrigation. Such
development takes place against the backdrop of “regionalism,” where the Columbia
River was to be an Organic Machine to be held in pursuit of the public purpose.
However, with the need to supply the national going plant in the aluminum industry
with electricity for the war effort, regionalist dreams for the Organic Machine would
not be fulfilled. Instead, dams like Bonneville and Grand Coulee would support the
development of a regional aluminum complex that was aimed at defeating fascists
during WWII.
Today the region remains tied to an identity that is intimately wrapped up
in salmon, the Columbia River, and the dams that have tamed it. The bond be-
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tween river, region, and salmon is taken as natural. But, as Vogel argues (2011),
such identity results from a process of social construction, wherein the Bonneville
Power Administration sought to legitimate itself as the central institution around the
regional economy that would be governed going forward.
This dissertation has sought to illuminate the process of cumulative develop-
ment whereby the Columbia River basin has become central to the viability of the
capitalist machine process, while undermining the viability of the system in which its
original inhabitants and their institutions were central. In doing so, we see that once
the region become firmly attached to the U.S. East and Europe, as a result of railroad
finance, persons in control of corporate institutions had always sought to construct
a provisioning process in which they were central. The true legacy of the process of
constructing a unified regional identity around the hydroelectric complex is one of
violence, dispossession and fraud.
Many unexplored areas have emerged in the process of developing this dis-
sertation. An interesting and fruitful avenue of research may focus on the Native
Question, to include a comparison of the gift economies of the indigenous occupants
of the region with the colonial settlers. Christopher Gregory (1982) provides a model
for this project using the surplus approach. Future research should also focus on
opposition to capitalist development of the region, including indigenous people, la-
borers, and farmers within the region. Finally, in the 20th century, an examination of
the effect of electrification in the region on household production and time-use would
constitute an interesting project.
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